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ABSTRACT
Cicala, John Edmond. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. August 2011. The Effect
of Perceived Salesperson Transparency, as Enabled by Technology, on Unethical Salesperson
Behavior. Major Professor: Alan J. Bush, Ph.D.

This research study introduces the concept of perceived salesperson transparency
to the existing literature of Sales and Marketing. It addresses how recent technological
developments impact traditional concerns of agency theory such as moral hazard and
adverse selection. Providing empirically-based insight into the use of technology to
decrease salesperson unethical behavior can help both organizations on a macro-level and
sales managers on a micro level better understand how to use such technology to develop
a more productive sales force.
This research created a conceptual definition of perceived transparency for
application on an individual level; as opposed to a broad, general definition for
application to companies, organizations, and government agencies. It conceptualized,
proposed, developed, and examined relationships between multiple dimensions of
perceived transparency and the likelihood of unethical salesperson behavior. It provides
empirical support for the idea that salesperson perceptions regarding sales managers' use
of information accessed through technological means has a mediating effect on the
relationship between the accessing of behavioral-related information and the likelihood of
unethical behavior. It further addresses the moderating effect of salesperson job
performance and salesperson beliefs regarding their ability to control their behavior. In
other words, what impacts salesperson behavior is not whether they perceive
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management can obtain information about their actions and behaviors, but,
rather how, or perhaps, if, they perceive management will use that information.
Hypotheses were tested using data obtained from a broad cross section of
professional business-to-business salespeople from a variety of industries. Measurement
scales established in prior research studies were adapted for use in this dissertation. All
were examined for dimensionality, convergent, and discriminant validity using
confirmatory factor analysis. Direct and indirect effects were investigated using
structural equation modeling. Support for all three proposed hypotheses in the mediation
model was found.
Technology is decreasing managers/principles historical inability to know how
their salespeople/agents behave during the selling process and, subsequently influence
salesperson behavior. However, this study suggests that it is management's behavior that
will influence salesperson behavior.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

A salesperson working out of his home in the northeastern United States, away from
direct managerial supervision, for a large international corporation was charged in 2010
with six counts of federal wire fraud charges for defrauding his employer of more than
$150,000. He is accused of filing false expense reports, including altered airline and
hotel receipts, to his corporate office. Examples of his alleged counterfeit claims include
$915 in airfare between Philadelphia and Richmond to meet with clients (while actually
vacationing in Arizona), $700 for baseball equipment for his son‟s Little League team (an
advertising expense), and $907 for clothing for his wife (listed as presents for clients)
(www.commercialappeal.com).
Controlling the behavior of their sales force is an ongoing issue for sales
managers. One especially difficult aspect of the supervisory duties of sales managers is
that salespeople often work unmonitored by their supervisors. Many of the core duties of
salespeople occur away from the office where supervisors or managers have historically
been unable to observe their actions and behaviors with clients, either prospective or
established ones. This unique work condition all too often provides salespeople with the
opportunity to engage in unethical behaviors (Zey-Ferrell and Ferrell 1982; Ferrell and
Gresham 1985).
Salespeople serve as an organization‟s boundary spanners with buying companies
and individual customers (Singh 1998). They are vital to the long-term success of any
organization involved in either transactional- or relationship-oriented selling (Leigh and
Marshall 2001). They generate revenue, maintain current knowledge of perpetually
1

changing markets, competitors, and products, moving inventory, manage a multitude of
internal and external relationships, provide industry and market intelligence, and do their
best to keep themselves and their co-workers employed (Weitz, Castleberry, and Tanner
2008). At the same time, in order to help obtain these goals, salespeople are vested with
benefits, privileges, and allowances typically not provided to other employees within an
organization. These perquisites often include the authority to spend company funds (or
reimbursement for spending their own money on work-related expenses), travel paid for
by the company, and the potential for higher than average compensation through a
commission based on their sales (either according to volume or revenue-generated). The
characteristic of field salespeople with the greatest potential for impact, though, is that
they work without any immediate supervision; their behaviors and activities during the
selling process are invisible to their managers (Weitz, Castleberry, and Tanner 2008).
Such covert working conditions can easily lead to illegal and unethical selling practices
(Ferrell, Fraedrich, and Ferrell 2008).
This unsupervised attribute of selling, along with the highly publicized business
ethics scandals of the past decade, is quite possibly why transparency has gained such
importance in business relationships today (Murphy, Laczniak, and Wood 2007). Early
research, such as Saxe and Weitz's landmark SOCO scale (1982) - which measures a
salesperson's orientation toward his or her clients - does not include, directly or
indirectly, salesperson transparency among the seven characteristics of customer-oriented
selling. However, they did include salesperson characteristics such as accurately
describing products and avoiding deceptive, manipulative, or high-pressure tactics into
their study.
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Recent advances in technology now allow firms to increase the transparency of
salesperson behavior by increasing sales management‟s ability to monitor various aspects
of the selling process (Bush et al.. 2007). Historically, sales managers relied on trusting
that the information contained in the various reports submitted to them by their
salespeople (i.e., the number of calls made, expense reports, status reports, prospect
qualifying, etc.) was honest and accurate. However, technology has now enabled sales
managers in the twenty-first century with the ability to verify whether such trust is
justifiable. Whether this ability will lead to more honest and ethical sales force behavior
has not been the focus of any major empirical academic study.
A gap clearly exists in the current personal selling research concerning the
relationship, if there is one, between salesperson perceptions of the transparency of their
behaviors to management, as brought about by recent technological creations, and the
ethicality of their behavior. In other words, do their perceptions regarding how much of
their behavior and actions management is monitoring influence their behavior; does how
they sell matter more than how much they sell?
A recent study shows that ethical decision-making by salespeople positively
correlates with higher sales performance (Schwepker and Ingram 1996). Although this
study did not account for technological determinants of the decision-making, it provides
strong empirical support for sales managers to encourage and develop the level of
ethicality of their salespeople. Therefore, finding empirical support for using technology
to increase salesperson transparency, and subsequently salesperson ethicality, would
provide sales managers with crucial information for performing their duties better. It
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could also result in improved sales performance, increased trust of salespeople, and
stronger customer relationships.
Thus, this research study advances existing knowledge in the fields of Personal
Selling, Sales Management, and Sales Ethics research by investigating the effect of
salesperson perceptions regarding the transparency of their behaviors to management, as
enabled by technology, on the ethicality of their behaviors. Its findings provide useful
information to academic researchers regarding the interaction of sales, technology, and
ethics and its application to problems associated with agency theory. Invaluable
guidance for sales management practitioners regarding the use of technology to monitor
salesperson behaviors is also a direct result of this study.
Rationale for the Study
A substantial amount of published research is available on the delicate
relationship between sales and ethics and the increased susceptibility salespeople have to
the temptation of engaging in less than ethical manners (Wotruba 1990; Schwepker 1999;
Ferrell, Johnston, and Ferrell 2008). Others have investigated how technology has the
potential to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of a sales force, were it not for
various issues surrounding the adoption of technology by salespeople (Erffmeyer and
Johnson 2001; Ahearne, Srinivasan, and Weinstein 2004; Hunter and Perreault 2007).
Still other academics have looked into what role ethics should play concerning advances
in technology; issues such as privacy and access to information have been common
themes in research articles (Kallman and Grillo 1996; Ryssel, Ritter, and Gemünden
2004; Turilli and Floridi 2009). However, the amount of research that exists on the
influence and impact of technology on salesperson ethicality is quite a bit smaller. Bush
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et al.. (2007) produced a dyadic qualitative study regarding sales technology and ethics
among salespeople and sales managers. It suggests two major categories to describe the
eight separate themes found: exploitation (salespeople) and control (sales managers).
Salespeople claim the ability to use technology to engage in unethical behaviors in their
dealings with their clients and their employer. Sales managers, on the other hand, boast
that they, in turn, can use technology to monitor activities during the selling process and
hold salespeople more accountable for accuracy in their communications (Bush et al..
2007).
Subsequent research (Bush, Bush, and Orr 2010) provides insight into
organizational use of internal codes to control unethical behavior of salespeople,
especially the ethicality of their use of technology. It concludes that it may very well be
in the best interest of organizations to monitor exactly how their sales forces use
technology. The research study proposed here, however, focuses not on the monitoring
of the ethical or unethical use of technology by salespeople, but rather uniquely on the
use of technology to monitor the ethical or unethical behavior of salespeople.
Specifically, it concentrates on salespersons‟ perceptions of how transparent their
behaviors are to management due to management‟s use of technology and what, if any,
influence these perceptions have on the ethicality of their behavior.
Research focused on predicting an individual‟s intent to perform (or not perform)
a particular behavior traditionally utilizes the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) (Ajzen
1988). This very well respected approach suggests that a person‟s intention to perform
(or not perform) a particular behavior can be predicted (and thereby controlled) through
the composite measurement of three types of beliefs: (1) behavioral beliefs, (2) normative
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beliefs, and (3) control beliefs. TPB has successfully predicted a range of social
behaviors, including those involving dishonesty among college students (Beck and Ajzen
1991), information technology (IT) behavior (Leonard, Cronan, and Kreie 2004), ethical
decision-making in the healthcare industry (Randall and Gibson 1991), smoking
cessation (Norman, Conner, and Bell 1999), and rule adherence among British youths
(Broadhead-Fearn and White 2006). Yet, no previous study found uses TPB to conduct a
self-reported investigation of salesperson performance of ethical behavior.
Neither will this study. It does not focus on predicting individual salesperson
performance of a specific behavior or their use of a particular sales technology. Instead,
it is concerned, generally, with the relationship between sales managers and salespeople
and, more specifically, the effect of managerial monitoring via technology, as perceived
by salespeople on the ethicality of their behavior. As such, agency theory provides the
theoretical foundation for this work that proposes the existence of a negative correlation
between perceived salesperson transparency and the likelihood of unethical salesperson
behavior performance. Agency theory has been used successfully to explain how sales
managers can control salesperson activities (Damon 1998), as well as salesperson
behaviors related to their perceived usefulness of, and adoption of, sales force automation
tools (sales technologies) (Mallin and DelVecchio 2007). Agency control plays a critical
role in reducing opportunistic behaviors, according to Fong and Tosi (2007).
Additionally, agency theory supplies the theoretical basis for the expected negative
moderating influences of salesperson job performance and salesperson beliefs on the
relationship between perceived salesperson transparency, as enabled by technology, and
ethical salesperson behavior.
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Salesperson Susceptibility. Salespeople are required to interact with customers,
co-workers, competitors, vendors, and others in socially interactive environments if they
are to be successful in performing their duties to generate revenue, increase market share,
and help management gain valuable knowledge related to the industry, the market, and
competitors that is incorporated into the organization‟s overall strategy (Weitz,
Castleberry, and Tanner 2008). They continually find themselves under a variety of
pressures to perform well and have this performance measured on a regular basis
(Schwepker and Ingram 2006). The level of competitiveness within Sales is typically
higher than most other professions (Weitz, Castleberry, and Tanner 2008). This constant
intensity of competitiveness usually adds to the temptation of unethical behavior among
salespeople (Hegarty and Sims 1970).
Not surprisingly then, salespeople are often more at risk to deviate from desired
ethical behaviors than are other organizational employees (Osborn and Hunt 1974; Ferrell
and Gresham 1985). Schwepker and Ingram (1996) openly acknowledge that, “personal
selling is an area of marketing that is particularly susceptible to ethical dilemmas,” (pp.
1151-1152). Salespeople are part of a small fraction of employees authorized to spend
company funds, have an expense account, and to spend a significant portion of their
workday away from the direct observation of company management. This lack of direct
supervision puts sales agents in a position to engage in behaviors that may not be
considered very ethical; which is why it has been suggested that, “deceptive practices are
often found in many areas of sales,” (Carson 2001, p. 275).
Some areas considered susceptible to unethical salesperson behavior include the
reporting of salesperson activities, use of company property, giving or accepting bribes to
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obtain special favors, and customer invoicing (Kaptein 2008; Weitz, Castleberry, and
Tanner 2008).
Ethical problems are not limited to internal issues involving co-workers or
management. Research shows salespeople experience ethical conflicts regularly in the
performance of their duties (Dubinsky, Berkowitz, and Rudelius 1980). Such struggles
can lead to lower job performance, increases in turnover, customer dissatisfaction, and
negative word-of-mouth about the selling organization (Walker, Churchill, and Ford
1977). More crippling is the negative impact that unethical behaviors of salespeople can
have on a firm‟s revenue, reputation, and success, both short-term and long-term. Ethical
salesperson behaviors, on the other hand, can increase trust (Romàn 2003; Ferrell,
Fraedrich, and Ferrell 2008) and thus, improve and strengthen relationships with clients
and customers. Hawes et al. (1989) advise salespeople to be honest if nothing else in
order to cultivate trust among their customers.
Therefore, organizations benefit by having more control over the selling process.
Management has applied a barrage of tools to aid salespeople, improve performance,
increase productivity, decrease turnover, expand their knowledge, make them more
efficient, effective, better presenters, stronger closers, etc. It is clear that management
has a great deal at stake in ensuring that all of its employees (especially salespeople given
their level of empowerment and responsibility) behave as ethically as possible.
Codes of Conduct. Corporations develop and implement codes of ethical conduct
for their employees through a formal process that includes formal training and usually
issue printed versions, as well as making behavioral standards accessible by employees
through the company website. This is done to regulate employees‟ conduct (Adam and
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Moore 1994). The most common form of managerial control of employee behavior is an
organization‟s code of ethics or conduct. They serve as a prime example of persuasive
communications designed to influence the behavior of an organization‟s employees,
including its sales force. A great deal of investigation was conducted on these guidelines
that spell out what is expected of employees concerning their behavior; what will and/or
will not be tolerated (Kaptein and Schwartz 2008). Schwartz (2001) identified five
possible reasons why employees do not comply with codes of ethics. Among them are
self-interest (greed or competition), company interest, and environment (i.e.,
opportunity).
For publically traded corporations, such documentation is required, because of the
2004 amendment to the 1991 Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations (Braswell,
Foster, and Poe 2004). Typically, these codes include a section informing employees that
they should have no expectations of privacy when using company equipment or resources
such as computers, telephones, cell phones, etc., so a firm‟s salespeople should recognize
that anything they create on or transmit through company property is itself company
property. Employees are to be in full compliance with, and will be held accountable – to
both the company itself and any external bodies of applicable authority – for digressions
from the organizational policies, practices, and procedures described in the codes. Yet,
despite the existence of such corporate codes of conduct, breaches of ethics by employees
continue to be an on-going problem for organizations (Vitell and Singhapakdi 2007). A
clarifying analogy is how society‟s governing bodies set limitations on the rates of speed
used while driving on public roads, yet the existence of these codes does not guarantee
compliance by those they were designed and enacted for.
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However, accountability for breaches of code-dictated policies can only occur
after the activities have (or have not as the case may be) been done; one cannot be held
accountable in advance. By informing workers in advance via the codes of behavioral
expectations, companies are able to prevent employees from engaging in illegal or
unethical behavior that could be detrimental to the firm‟s future and thus avoid
accountability issues. The utilization of technology to monitor employee‟s actions in the
form of their written or spoken internal and external communications, their accessing of
company records, their submission of reports, their scheduled activities, etc. is simply
another way for ensure compliance with stated behavioral expectations and to stave off
the occurrence of legal and ethical problems.
Enabling Transparency by Applying Technology. When customers believe that a
salesperson works for an ethical organization, they are likely to see the salesperson as
ethical and credible (Mulki, Jaramillo, and Locander 2006). One method of helping
salespeople avoid the temptation of engaging in unethical behavior is to have their
actions - and all seven steps that encompass the selling process (Moncrief and Marshall
2005) - made more transparent to their managers via technology. Technology, in the
form of software that can track computer keyboard keystrokes, blind copy emails/attachments to management without the sending salesperson‟s knowledge, or GPS
systems in smart phones and company vehicles that can pinpoint the device‟s location
almost anywhere on the planet, enables management to have a more transparent sales
force. Technology enables the ability to access salesperson records, files, activities, and
other information relevant to salesperson activities and behavior. However, the
salespeople must perceive that such abilities are actually used if they are to perceive their
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behaviors as fully transparent. It is one thing if salespeople sense that their supervisors
have the capability to monitor sales activities, but the influence is more powerful if they
sense it actually occurs.
Conceptual Foundation
This section of chapter one will discuss the various concepts incorporated into this
research study. The different constructs used in the conceptual framework (Figure 1.1
below) will be defined, clarified, and linked together. Constructs are abstract and latent
variables or concepts that are more general than specific behaviors (Nunnally 1978).
They may be defined in conceptual terms but cannot be measured directly or without
error (Hair et al. 2006). A model depicting the conceptual framework is provided in
Figure 1.1 at the end of this chapter.
Perceived Salesperson Transparency Enabled by Technology. The first construct,
perceived salesperson transparency as enabled by technology, is a previously undefined
variation of transparency. As no existing conceptual definition exists, it will be defined
operationally; that is, its meaning will be explained by specifying the activities and
operations necessary to measure and evaluate it (Kerlinger and Lee 2000). It is intended
to represent an individual salesperson‟s perceptions of the level of transparency of his or
her behavior to management. In order to measure a person‟s perception of his or her own
level of transparency, transparency itself must be defined.
Transparency International defines transparency as, “a standard or principle that
allows individuals affected by administrative decisions or business transactions to be
aware of both the various policies and procedures of administrative decisions or business
transactions that affect them and of the underlying determinants and expected
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consequences of these actions,” (www.transparency.org/news_room/faq). Turilli and
Floridi (2009) claim transparency is the, “possibility of accessing information, intentions,
or behaviors that have been intentionally revealed through a process of disclosure,” (p.
105). Tapscott and Ticoll (2003) define transparency simply as, “the accessibility of
information,” (p. 22). Eggert and Helm (2002) provide the only non-organizational
oriented definition by describing what they refer to as relationship transparency as, “a
person‟s subjective perception of being informed about the relevant actions and
properties of the other party in the interaction,” (p. 103). Thus, perceived transparency
would appear to be a perception of how accessible information regarding interactions are
to those involved in the interactions. Likewise, perceived salesperson transparency can
be defined as how accessible a salesperson perceives information about his or her
interactions is to others; i.e., how much information is known by others about their workrelated activities (interactions). Technology enables sales managers to monitor the
activities and behaviors of their salespeople (Bush et al. 2007), as they never could
before.
Yet, none of these definitions addresses a very important element regarding
perceived transparency or visibility: how the information obtained because of
transparency through monitoring is going to be used, if at all. This study proposes that in
addition to perceived access to information, the perceived use of information represents a
second important dimension of perceived transparency; for if accessed information is
perceived as not being used by the other party, then any consequences (positive or
negative) of the accessibility of the information are nullified. Conversely, management
must have information in order to use it and accessing it is how they come to have it.
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Therefore, without access there can be no use. This is a prime topic for future research
and will be discussed as such in Chapter 5, but transparency's various possible
dimensions are not the primary focus of this research study.
Agency Theory. Agency theory (AT) provides the theoretical support for the
belief that salesperson perceptions regarding the transparency of their actions to
management, as enabled by technology, will influence the ethicality of their actions.
Bergen, Dutta, and White (1992) state that, “the relationship between a sales manager and
salesperson is an agency relationship,” (p. 8). AT poses that the type of contractual
relationship (outcome or behavior-based) that exists between an agent (salesperson) and a
principal (employing firm) will determine whose interests are greater (Eisenhardt 1989;
Kurland 1996). It is believed that a behavior-based relationship, such as that enabled by
technological transparency of the agents by the principals, will result in less unethical
behavior by the agents.
The visibility of salespeople that sales technology creates has important
implications on the transparency of salesperson behavior. One of the main themes of
sales managers, according to Bush et al. (2007), is the ability of technology to help them,
“monitor and manage the sales process, thereby achieving better control of ethical
issues,” (p. 1202). Combining these elements then defines perceived salesperson
transparency enabled by technology as a salesperson‟s perception of management‟s
ability to monitor and influence relevant behaviors using sales technology information.
Salesperson perceptions of management‟s ability to use technology to monitor
and influence behavior will be measured by determining salesperson perceptions
concerning management‟s ability to monitor a variety of work related behaviors. These
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will include activities conducted externally towards customers, as well as those
conducted internally towards administration and management. The greater the number of
activities and behaviors that salespeople perceive management monitors for the sake of
influencing salesperson behavior, the greater their perceived transparency is. Additional
measures will be taken to determine how much, if any, influence such perceptions have
over ethical salesperson behavior.
Ethical Salesperson Behavior. The dependent variable construct of this study‟s
model is conceptually defined as, “that set of actions on the part of the salesperson which
may be perceived as right, just, or morally correct,” (Lagrace, Ingram, and Boroom 1994,
p. 119). There are many examples of unethical behavior by and among employees, such
as personal use of office equipment, falsely calling out sick, doctoring company records,
or taking credit for another‟s accomplishment (Newstrom and Ruch 1975; O‟Clock and
Okleshen 1993). It is suggested that the successful development of trust-based
relationships requires that a salesperson exhibit, “at least one form of ethical sales
behavior - being honest,” (Hawes et al. 1989, p. 1153). Thus, this construct will be
operationalized by the performance of dishonest actions. These will be measured using
Lagrace, Ingram, and Boorom‟s (1994) uni-dimensional scale designed to measure three
categories of unethical salesperson behavior - lying, withholding information, and
overlooking customer interests (Bearden and Netemeyer 1999).
Reasoned Action Approach. According to Ajzen‟s (1988) Theory of Planned
Behavior, as well as Fishbein and Ajzen‟s (2010) Reasoned Action Approach (RAA), a
person‟s intention to perform or not perform a specific behavior can be predicted. This
approach works by measuring three related individual beliefs. The first is the person‟s
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belief regarding the consequences of performing or not performing the behavior in
question, which in turn drives their attitude towards the behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen
2010). The second is their beliefs of what they believe others, whose opinions are
important to them, will think of them for performing the behavior, along with how they
believe those same others would behave if they were in a similar situation. The third
component is how much control they believe they personally have regarding their ability
to perform the behavior in question (i.e., do they believe there are personal or
environmental factors that would facilitate or impede their ability to behave) (Fishbein
and Ajzen 2010, p. 22). Therefore, if a salesperson met al.l of the TPB/RAA criteria,
their intention to perform an unethical behavior, for example misrepresenting information
to a client in order to make a sale, could be predicted. It should be noted that the term
“performance” is used to represent actual and successful engaging in a particular
behavior, as opposed to simply attempting to engage in it (Beck and Ajzen 1991). The
theory‟s authors stress that, “the presence of environmental constraints can prevent
people from acting on their intentions,” (p. 21). This study focuses on salesperson
perceptions of the monitoring of their behaviors by management via sales technology.
Therefore, it is felt that the integration of this theory that involves the impact of
environmental factors on a person‟s behavioral intent is quite applicable. It is expected
that salespeople with high intentions to perform dishonest behavior (either internally or
externally) will moderate the relationship between perceived salesperson transparency
and ethical salesperson behavior.
Salesperson Job Performance. It is thought that a salesperson‟s job performance
could have a moderating effect on the relationship between the perceived level of
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transparency and the likelihood of unethical salesperson behavior. Schwepker and
Ingram (1996) found a positive correlation between an individual salesperson‟s moral
judgment and its association with a high level of salesperson performance. Salespeople
with the behavior desired by management have nothing to be concerned about regarding
increased levels of behavioral transparency to management due to technology.
However, not all high performance is the result of ethically upstanding behavior;
some high performance may result from unethical salesperson behavior. For example, a
salesperson may have a strong sales record due to either to misrepresentation or making
promises to clients that cannot be filled than blaming others for their not being realized.
This type of salesperson has the most to fear from transparency. If a salesperson is a high
performer due to the latter approach, they may feel somewhat insulated from any
potential negative consequences (reprimand, punishment, or termination) should their
disreputable tactics become known to management as a direct result of increased
transparency due to technology.
Research Contributions
This research furthers the existing knowledge of both practitioners and academic
researchers in the areas of Sales, Marketing, and Sales Ethics. This section of Chapter 1
will discuss the contributions of this research to academia and application in more detail.
Existing Literature. No known published empirical research was found to have
ever been undertaken, nor any theory developed, to address whether the use of
technology to monitor the behavior of salespeople influences their level of ethical
behavior, either internally with co-workers and management or externally with
customers. Although esteemed works exist in sales ethics, this research is differentiated
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by its focus on obtaining the salesperson‟s perspective (as opposed to management‟s)
regarding the use of technology to increase transparency. It has been recommended that
research from the salesperson‟s perspective be conducted in order to learn more about
their perceptions regarding both ethics and the application of technology (Bush, et al.
2007); this study clearly answers that call.
It extends previous research concerning the impact of variables such as
commission-based compensation (Kurland 1996), sociological factors (Dubinsky and
Ingram 1984), and ethical climate (Schwepker 2003) on salesperson ethics. It will
continue research on the ethicality of salesperson behavior with respect to ethical
decision-making determinants (Ferrell and Gresham, 1985; Hunt and Vitell, 1986;
Schwepker 1999; Weeks et al. 2004; Valentine et al. 2010), as well as environmental and
managerial influences (Ingram, LaForge, and Schwepker 2007; Valentine and Barnett
2007).
Lastly, this study is in keeping with Robertson‟s (1993) call for more empirical
research into business ethics, with behavior serving as the key dependent variable, instead
of attitude.
Theoretical Contributions. This research advances the application of two
different theories that have provided the conceptual foundation for much research:
agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989) and to a lesser extent, the theory of planned
behavior/reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen 1977, 1980, and 2010). Agency theory
addresses several issues related to the struggle between cooperation and self-interest in
the relationship that exists when one party (the principal or management in this setting)
hires another party (the agent or salesperson) to perform some task in exchange for a
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level of compensation agreed upon in advance. The most relevant issue is the problem
known as adverse selection, defined by Kurland (1996) as occurring when one party to a
transaction knows relevant things but does not share them with the other. Investigating
how the use of technology by the principal to increase the transparency of the agent
influences the behavior of the agent clearly expands academia‟s knowledge of agency
theory. A second advancement of agency theory brought out in this study concerns
assumptions of moral hazard or risk sharing (Eisenhardt 1989). Agency theory
traditionally assumes individuals/agents as being fairly risk averse due to their having
only one source of income (Wright et al. 2001), while companies are more willing to take
on risk as they have multiple sources of revenue generations (more than one salesperson,
for example). Salespeople, unlike the individuals more commonly incorporated into
agency theory examples, are also seen as being risk takers, especially those on straight
commission compensation plans (Eisenhardt 1985). However, the type of risk a
salesperson may be willing to incur may not be the type their organization desires be
taken. A relevant example of this would be lying to a potential customer in order to make
a sale, hoping that the falsehood is not found out. Therefore, there is a concern over both
the level of risk adversity (how) and the conditions under which those risks are to be
taken (when).
Finally, the control beliefs portion of the Theory of Planned Behavior/Reasoned
Action Approach (Fishbein and Ajzen 1977, 1980, 2010) addresses the moderating effect
that individual salesperson beliefs regarding their ability to control their own behavior
has on the relationship between their perceived transparency and the likelihood of their
engaging in unethical behavior. This has clear application for sales managers desiring to
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alter the potentially damaging unethical behavior of salespeople. This study will increase
the number of situations in which this theory has been applied, although in this setting it
will be used to support individual belief as a moderating variable of the relationship
between salesperson perceived transparency and their level of ethical behavior. It is
expected that a salesperson‟s beliefs could negate the proposed positive correlation
between perceived transparency and ethical behavior; i.e., that the salesperson believes to
such a high degree that there is nothing unethical in being dishonest with a manager or a
client that it would not be deterred by a high perception of being monitored by
management. Although technology could be seen as a form of control belief (one of
TPB‟s three determining belief), planned behavior is individual- oriented whereas agency
theory is relationship-oriented.
Managerial Contributions. It has been shown that marketers, such as salespeople,
by the very nature of their duties, are put into situations that must be judged as being
ethical or unethical (Ferrell and Gresham 1985). Additionally, the opportunities to make
unethical decisions have been shown to be less prevalent in non-marketing areas (Ferrell
and Gresham 1985). Furthermore, as salespeople are the primary boundary spanners of
an organization (Weitz, Castleberry, and Tanner 2008), they have more direct contact
with individuals outside of the organization than other employees. This increased
exposure to the environment places them under more pressure to deviate from desired
ethical behavior (Osborn and Hunt 1974). Examples of deviant behavior include
misrepresentation of product information or ability, puffery, lack of full disclosure,
manipulation, offers of kickbacks, bribes, offers to share of confidential information
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regarding either the selling company or competitors (Weitz, Castleberry, and Tanner
2008).
A great deal of research has been conducted in sales ethics in an attempt to better
identify and understand the various determinants and consequences of employee
decision-making (McClaren 2000). The results of these studies have provided guidance
to countless numbers of sales managers and frontline salespeople alike regarding how to
avoid conduct that either is, or has the potential to become, unethical and detrimental to
both themselves individually as well as to their organization collectively.
A key concept in obtaining this desirable behavior is the principle of
transparency, which is grounded in the belief that employee decision-making should not
be based on an agent‟s personal agenda (as opposed to that of the principal) and that
every employee should conduct business in a truthful and open manner (Paine et al. 2005;
Stanwick and Stanwick 2008). So, if transparency helps to drive desired intentions in
business relationships, can it also serve as a determinant of ethical decision-making in
such situations?
If the use of technology to monitor a salesperson‟s activities can be shown to lead
to more ethical decisions and behavior, then sales managers should adopt such an
approach across the board. If certain modes of monitoring should prove more impactful
than others, for example, if monitoring e-mails has more influence over salespeople‟s
ethical decision-making than monitoring their location during the course of a workday via
global positioning systems within company issued smart or cell phones, than the one
should be adopted over the other or perhaps GPS-tracking should be abandoned
altogether.
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Outline of the Study
This work is organized into five distinct chapters. Chapter 2 reviews existing
applicable literature concerning the interplay of sales, ethics, and sales technology. The
hypotheses to be tested will be developed and presented. Chapter 3 provides details
regarding the study‟s methodology. It discusses the measures employed in the research
and identifies the scales selected for measuring salesperson perceived levels of
transparency, sales technology, salesperson beliefs, and the likelihood of unethical
salesperson behavior. Chapter 4 presents the results and relevance of the data analysis.
Chapter 5 discusses the theoretical implications and managerial applications of the
study's results as well as recognized limitations of the research and recommendations for
future research. Figure 1.1 below provides a conceptual framework of the study.

Salesperson Job
Performance

Perceived Salesperson
Transparency as Enabled
by Technology

Unethical
Salesperson
Behavior

Salesperson
Beliefs
FIGURE 1.1
Conceptual Framework of the Effect of Perceived Salesperson Transparency,
as Enabled by Technology, on Unethical Salesperson Behavior
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Foundations

This chapter assesses existing literature pertinent to the development and research
of salesperson ethicality, including its relationship to salesperson job performance, as
well as the application and growing influence of various sales technologies. It provides
an in-depth description of agency theory, the theoretical foundation for the proposed
research. It also supplies an overview of the Theory of Planned Behavior, the theory
used to explain the inclusion of salesperson beliefs as a possible moderating variable. A
set of testable hypotheses is presented and defined, in accordance with the applicable
literature and theoretical foundations. A framework is presented at the end of the chapter
that graphically portrays the hypothesized relationships between perceived salesperson
transparency as enabled by technology, ethical salesperson behavior, salesperson job
performance, and salesperson beliefs.
Perceived Transparency
Transparency has become the buzzword of the twenty-first century to represent
accuracy, truth, and the full(but-not-too-full) disclosure of relevant information (Murphy,
Laczniak, and Wood 2007); serving as a means of preventing deception (Paine et al.
2005) by allowing for better decisions, furthering knowledge, promoting cooperation,
encouraging economic efficiency and effectiveness, and improving societal functioning
(Paine et al. 2005).
Transparency International, an organization dedicated to fighting corruption,
defines transparency as a principle allowing, "those affected by administrative decisions,
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business transactions or charitable work to know not only the basic facts and figures but
also the mechanisms and processes,” (www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/html).
Transparency has also been referred to as a principle involving the accurate
presenting of relevant information and of correcting any communicating of
misinformation (Paine et al. 2005). Turilli and Floridi (2009) argue that transparency is a
“pro-ethical condition” allowing for other ethical practices or conditions to be either
enabled or impaired.
Transparency has been recognized as both a property of a system and as an
element that can be built into a business relationship (Lamming et al. 2001). In the latter
type of situation, managers in express associations can use transparency in a variety of
forms for specific purposes, such as with pricing in supply relationships (Lamming et al.
2001). They subcategorize transparency into “cost transparency” (where costs and other
operating details are entirely open to all parties involved) and “value transparency,”
which, they claim, reflects a level of transparency whereby parties go beyond sharing
sensitive information to sharing risk as well (Lamming et al. 2001).
Other authors have subcategorized the concept as well. Corporate transparency
has been characterized as, “the availability of firm-specific information to those outside
publicly traded firms,” (Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith 2003, p. 208), while others,
however, believe the phrase to be “volatile and imprecise”, instead preferring the term
„dynamic transparency‟ to reference two-way informational exchange between
corporations and marketplaces (Vaccaro and Madsen 2009, p.113). Relationship
transparency is, “a person‟s subjective perception of being informed about the relevant
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actions and properties of the other party in the interaction” (Eggert and Helm 2002, p.
103).
Tapscott and Ticoll (2003) present transparency not as a principle, but more as a
condition, defining it as, “the access of information to stakeholders of institutions
regarding matters that affect their interest,” (p. 22). Leigh and Marshall (2001) point out
that a, “much greater amount of information will be transparent to the sales force,” due to
advances in CRM-oriented technology. Exploratory discussions with individuals directly
involved in corporate information technology agree that accessibility is a key ingredient
to achieving transparency. Various definitions are summarized in Table 2.1 below.
Some research suggests that technological developments in customer relationship
management (CRM) have a direct impact on a firm‟s sales force. Bush et al. (2007)
suggests that salespeople will no longer be alone in the spotlight as in the past, but rather
will be very visible through the technology that enables sales force automation or “sales
technology.” This research does not refer to an individual‟s level of transparency, actual
or perceived. The closest inference to the form of transparency found in the agency type
of relationship between a salesperson and sales manager connection would be Eggert and
Helms‟ (2003) relationship transparency. Sales managers and salespeople are clearly
involved in a business relationship whose transparency to the other is based in part on
their subjective perceptions of the accessibility of information regarding relevant actions
and behaviors of the other party in the interaction (internally with management).
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TABLE 2.1
A Summary Table of Transparency Definitions
from Existing Literature
Source
Transparency International
(www.transparency.org/
news_room/faq)
Eggert and Helm (2002, p. 103)

Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith 2003, p.
208)
Tapscott and Ticoll (2003, p. 22)

Paine et al. (2005, p. 131)

Turilli and Floridi (2009, p. 105)

Vaccaro and Madsen (2009, p. 113)

Definition
A principle that allows those affected by
administrative decisions, business transactions or
charitable work to know not only the basic facts and
figures but also the mechanisms and processes.
A person‟s subjective perception of being informed
about the relevant actions and properties of the
other party in the interaction. (Relationship
transparency)
The availability of firm-specific information to
those outside publicly traded firms.
The access of information to stakeholders of
institutions regarding matters that affect their
interest.
A principle involving the accurate presenting of
relevant information and of correcting any
communicating of misinformation.
The possibility of accessing information, intentions,
or behaviors that have been intentionally revealed
through a process of disclosure.
Two-way informational exchange between
corporations and marketplace (dynamic
transparency).

Salespeople are also in business relationships with their customers, wherein both
salesperson and client have subjective perceptions of the accessibility of information
regarding the other‟s actions and behaviors. Phrased differently, the lack of access to
information represents a lack of transparency. Therefore, perceived access to information
is a crucial element of perceived transparency. One way information is accessed is
through monitoring, or direct observation. Recent developments in technology and
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electronics have increased the ability to monitor activities and behaviors tremendously
(Bush et al. 2007).
Nebeker and Tatum (1993) define electronic monitoring as using electronic
devices to gather, analyze, and warehouse actions or performances by individuals or
groups. Aiello and Douthitt (2001) state that, “electronic performance monitoring
enables managers to gather performance related information about employees without
physical observation,” (p. 178). Electronic monitoring, then, is simply a way to obtain
information and by such make those being monitored more transparent. Nevertheless, are
simply having one‟s activities and behaviors enough to qualify them as being
transparent? No. If salespeople perceive that the information being obtained by their
managers through technologically enabled monitoring is not being used by management
to influence their behaviors or activities, then, it would be as if the monitoring is nonexistent – thus there is either no or a very low level of perceived transparency. However,
if salespeople perceive that management is using information being obtained through the
monitoring of their behavior, then at the very least, a higher level of transparency is
perceived. One example of how sales managers use this access to information is in being
able to hold their salespeople more accountable for the accuracy of their communications
(Bush et al. 2007). A recent accounting ethics study conducted by Mayhew and Murphy
(2009) found that individuals whose identity and reporting behavior was to be made
public misreported information at significantly lower rates than those who remained
anonymous. Therefore, this study proposes that Perceived Salesperson Transparency, as
Enabled by Technology, be defined as a salesperson‟s perception of management‟s
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ability to access (i.e., monitor), and thereby influence (i.e., use the accessed information)
relevant behaviors through Sales Technology.
Sales Technology
As stated earlier, technological developments have enabled sales managers to
monitor aspects of the selling process that they previously could not (Bush et al. 2007).
Research into sales technology, also referred to as Sales Force Automation, defined as the
application of different kinds of technology, in both communicative and informative
ways, to execute selling and sales management duties more efficiently and more
effectively (Ingram, LaForge, and Leigh 2002), especially in the area of managing their
relationships with customers. Hunter and Perreault (2007) suggest that technology‟s
influence on the relationship between a buyer and a seller is more striking than its
impacts in other areas of business.
A number of studies focus on how both sales managers and sales people could
best utilize recent developments in technology (Morgan and Inks 2001; Jones, Sundaram,
and Chin 2002; Robinson, Marshall, and Stamps 2005). Ingram et al. (2002) present a
well-thought out overview of how sales organizations could utilize new technologies
more rewardingly over time.
Sales technology research has been conducted on the potential problems created
by recent technological developments (Spier and Venkatesh 2002; Honeycutt 2005); predeployment attitudes toward it and its intended use by administration and front-line
salespeople (Sundaram et al. 2007); making it effective (Hunter and Perreault 2007);
accompanying managerial implications (Bush, Moore, and Rocco 2005); and productivity
(Clark, Rocco, and Bush 2007). Hunter and Perreault (2006) propose a model for
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organizations to measure the cost effectiveness of implementing new sales technologies,
including the effect of salesperson ability to learn and use the sales technology.
One of the more popular topics related to sales technologies usage concerns its
application to customer relationship management (CRM). It has been suggested that
information technology is an organizational strategy that caused CRM to develop into
more of a business philosophy than a system to manage customer contact information;
thus explaining why so much capital has been invested to increase salesperson
effectiveness and efficiency (Leigh and Marshal 2001). CRM is described as both a
“business philosophy and a technology," (Hunter and Perreault 2006, p. 96). Tanner et
al. (2005) describe CRM as a “cross-functional process” that allows for on-going
personalized communications between sellers and buyers. This, in turn, leads to greater
client retention. Swift (2001) also addresses the need to understand as clearly as possible
how technology, such as the Internet, can be integrated with an organization‟s sales force.
Unfortunately, neither recognizes the potential for unethical behavior or the need to
monitor for such.
Ahearne, Srinivasan, and Weinstein‟s (2004) work on the impact of technology
on sales performance is perhaps the closest of all existing studies to the one proposed
here. Their findings indicate the existence of a point of optimization; i.e., where sales
performance that has been enabled by CRM technology begins to diminish, eventually
resulting in a “disabling effect.”
However, despite all of the existing and impressive research on technology‟s farreaching potential to impact every aspect of the selling process, and the role of trust in
business relationships, an incredibly, inexplicably small number of studies include any

28

reference to the potential ethical issues involved; not as their primary focus nor even as a
possible topic for future research. One area of interest is how technology has made an
increasing amount of confidential company information transparent to salespeople, in
both terms of accessibility and in monitoring. This includes elements of company
strategy, previously unavailable to front-line salespeople (Leigh and Marshall 2001).
Salespeople express the ease with which they can use technology to exploit, spy on,
deceive, and manipulate others internal and external to the firm. Potentially more
devastating to an organization is the simplicity involved in salespeople poaching
company files and confidential information for their own personal gain; again, due to
technology (Bush et al. 2007). Bush, Bush, and Orr (2010), note that it may be in the
best interest of the organization to monitor the ethical use of technology by salespeople.
Along with monitoring to ensure salespeople use technology ethically, salesoriented organizations can use technology to monitor the overall ethical behavior of their
sales force. The procedures they utilize to accomplish the monitoring, directing, and
assessing of their employees are known as a control system. There are two types of
control systems: behavior-based and outcome-based (Anderson and Oliver 1987). Under
an outcome-based control system, managers‟ evaluations of their salespersons tend to be
teleological, that is, based on what their results are (revenue, profit, units moved, etc.),
not how those results were obtained. Behavior-based systems, however, involve
managers who “work to ensure the sales force behaves accordingly,” (Anderson and
Oliver 1987, p. 77). There is growing support for utilizing this manner of system with
salespeople, “a prominent stream of research on sales performance has shown that sales
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organizations may benefit from the use of behavior-based control systems,” (Hunter and
Perreault 2007, p. 19).
If a marketer, “can predict the consequences of changing certain resources under
his control, then the marketer has at least some ability to control the system,” (Hunt 1991,
p. 107). Sales managers have several resources at their disposal to control the selling
system: financial resources (compensation plans such as sales contests, bonuses, or
commissions), administrative resources (such as company policies and procedures, codes
of ethics or conduct), and technological resources (such as the ability to monitor
salesperson communications and other work-related activities that occur under or away
from direct supervision). Therefore, it follows that if sales managers can use these
resources to predict ethical salesperson behavior; they should be better able to control and
ensure ethical salesperson behavior.
Unethical Salesperson Behavior
Business Ethics. Early articles on the ethicality of business practices were more
observing and suggestive (Baumhart 1961; Bartels 1967), with some questioning the
strategy of organizations to concern themselves with moral issues, “the governing rule in
industry should be that something is good only if it pays" (Levitt 1958). Ethical behavior
is defined as, “behavior that conforms to a set of moral principles or values,” (Sherwin
1983, p. 186). Kaptein (2008) writes that business ethics involves both the ethics of
business organizations and of people and groups in business organizations. According to
Lewis (1985) and Kaptein (2008), adherence to the moral norms contained in the various
codes, rules, standards, and principles designed to provide guidance for morally sound
behavior is what constitutes ethical behavior; violation of them is the equivalent of
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unethical behavior. Therefore, the failure of employees (agents) to adhere to the codes
and standards of ethics or conduct set forth by their employers (principals) would be
considered as unethical behavior under these definitions. This study will operationalize
salesperson behavioral ethicality by the likelihood of their performing behaviors
recognized as unethical, i.e., deceiving clients, falsifying administrative reports, failing to
disclose relevant information to potential buyers, etc.
Uncertainty over what should be expected from business ethics research has also
been examined. For example, Solomon (1992) asks what relevant ethical theories should
look like and how should they be applied, if they even exist. Over time, individual
departments of organizations became the subject matter of more concentrated
investigatory efforts: management (Sherwin 1983), purchasing (Rudelius and Buchholz,
1979), marketing (Ferrell and Weaver 1978; Laczniak 1983; Hunt, Wood, and Chonko
1989), and, even sales (Dubinsky and Ingram 1983; Wotruba 1990; Dubinsky et al. 1992;
Bellizzi 1995).
Early works looked into an individual‟s personal ethics (Kohlberg 1969).
Kohlberg‟s (1969) work, begun in the late 1950‟s, led to his Theory of Cognitive Moral
Development (CMD). CMD emphasizes the cognitive processes involved in how an
individual determines the moral rightness of a course of action (Trevino 1992). It has
received a tremendous amount of attention from business ethics researchers (Gibbs and
Widaman 1982). Mayer‟s (1970) work on determinants of unethical behavior argues that
dishonest behavior by an individual may occur under any of three conditions: (1) an
inclination towards such behavior, (2) the opportunity to engage in such behavior, and (3)
expectation of gains that more than offset possible penalties. Hegarty and Sims (1978)
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found four variables of personality to be significant covariates of unethical behavior: (1)
locus of control, (2) economic value orientation, (3) political value orientation, and (4)
Machiavellianism. This study also found ethical decision behavior to be lower under
conditions of extrinsic reward and higher under threat of punishment. Another
noteworthy finding from this study is that publicity can have a positive influence because
it acts as a “threat of punishment” and therefore has a restricting impact on unethical
behavior. Further, without some form of consequential punishment associated with
unethical behavior, combined with competitive situations where such behavior is
profitable, individuals who are, “not endowed with high standards of ethical conduct,”
are likely to give in to the profitable temptations of unethical behavior (Mayhew and
Murphy 2009, p. 456).
Several benchmark models developed a generation or so earlier, identify key
determinants of ethical decision-making among marketers (Ferrell and Gresham 1985;
Hunt and Vitell 1986; Wotruba 1990). Common among these are the influences of a
person‟s own sense of right and wrong, those of significant other referent groups, and the
opportunity to perform unethical behavior.
Studies on the relationships between ethical behavior and possible demographic
determinant external factors such as age and gender have been inconclusive (Weeks,
Moore, and McKinney 1999). One investigation found that younger business
professionals exhibited a lower standard of ethical beliefs, with younger males
demonstrating lower ethical beliefs than females and being more susceptible to external
factors (Peterson, Rhoads, and Vaught 2001). Valentine et al. (2010), in opposition to
this, found males performed more ethically than females.
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The amount of influence that the ethical climate of a workplace has over a
person‟s ethicality is also a common topic of debate. Ethical climate, in the context of a
selling organization, has been defined as how salespeople perceive their company‟s
ethical standards as evidenced by their practices, procedures, norms, and values
(Schwepker 2001).
Ferrell and Gresham (1985) found people at home had less influence over ethical
decision-making than managers and supervisors, while Peterson, Rhoads, and Vaught
(2001), found people at home had the most influence on ethical beliefs. The implication
of this is that although personal values may hold greater sway over a salesperson‟s
beliefs, they may be discarded in favor of values deemed more beneficial to the
organization. This, in turn, can lead to salespersons engaging in behaviors that conflict
with their own personal set of values in order to obtain gain for either themselves or their
employer. This could especially be the case if such questionable behavior is perceived to
lead to a possible reward from their employer (Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga 1993). It has
been shown that customers tend to perceive a salesperson that works for an organization
with a high ethical climate as also being ethical and credible (Mulki, Jaramillo, and
Locander 2006).
Other studies have looked at the relationships between individual ethical values
and job performance (Schwepker and Ingram 1996) as well as the influence of ethical
climate on salesperson job satisfaction and intent to remain (Valentine et al. 2009). The
growing acceptance of service-dominant logic has made ethicality accountability easier to
integrate into decision making of marketers and salespeople (Abela and Murphy 2008).
Sales and Salesperson Ethics
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The importance of ethics in sales cannot be understated. Schwepker and Ingram
(1996) wrote, “...salespeople making more ethical decisions indicate higher
performance,” (p. 1155), supporting the belief that an ethical salesperson performs better
for themselves and their organization. Hawes et al. (1989) pointed out that to develop
“trust-based relationships with customers,” salespeople must exhibit at least one form of
ethical sales behavior, being honest,” (Hawes, et al. 1989, p. 1153). Salespeople‟s ethical
beliefs have been found to be less sensitive to ethics than purchasing agents‟ are
(Dubinsky and Gwin 1981).
One reason for the continued importance of ethical behavior among
organizational boundary spanners is that accountability from ethical and legal
perspectives is at an all-time high. This may be due to its being one of three dimensions
common to those working world of sales. Ingram et al. (2005) acknowledge that
practicing ethical sales behavior is, “easier said than done,” (Ingram et al. 2005, p. 149),
but that as accountability increases, sales managers must focus on ensuring the
compliance with the organization‟s ethical and legal framework. Adding to the ethical
dilemmas facing salespeople are the expectations and responses of management. Sales
managers are responsible for defining, communicating, and enforcing the standards of
ethical behavior (Johnston and Marshall 2003).
Management‟s decision to either positively or negatively reinforce salesperson
behavior is more influenced by the rightness or wrongness of the behavior (deontological
orientation), than by the consequences of them (teleological orientation) (Hegarty and
Sims 1970; Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga 1993). Sales managers in a recent study by
DeConinck and Lewis (1997) admitted to basing their decision to reward or reprimand
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unethical behavior not on the behavior itself, but how the behavior affected the company.
One-fourth claimed they would reward unethical behavior (overstating factory capacity)
that resulted in a positive outcome (sale) for the organization before they would reward
ethical behavior (honestly stating capacity) if it influenced the company negatively (no
sale) (DeConinck and Lewis 1997).
Schwepker and Ingram (2006) investigated the relationship between individual
moral judgment and performance of salespeople, finding that higher moral judgment
positively correlated with higher performance. The empirical work of Valentine et al.‟s
(2010) empirical research among white-collar workers in the financial industry found a
positive response between job satisfaction (lack of intent to discontinue employment) and
ethical behavioral. Positive job response was associated with higher supervisory ratings
of the subordinates‟ ethical job performance. The authors wrote, “…an employee’s
ethical decision-making is regarded as an aspect of his or her job performance,”
(Valentine et al. 2010, p. 196). It is of note that they advocated research being
undertaken in the future to specifically define what is considered ethical job performance.
Recent studies have investigated the determinants of ethical decision-making specifically
among salespeople (Schwepker 1999; Weeks et al. 2004; Schwepker and Good 2007;
Mulki, Jaramillo, and Locander 2009), as well as its consequences (Hansen and Riggle
2009; Rogers 2009).
This study will focus its measurement of ethical salesperson behavior on Hawes et
al.‟s (1989) recommendation that honesty is the one ethical behavior every salesperson
should have in order to develop relationships based on trust. It will be operationalized by
the performance of dishonest actions. These actions will be measured using a 12-item
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scale. Ten of the items are from existing scales that measure unethical salesperson
behavior (Lagace, Ingram, and Boorom 1994; Kaptein 2008). Lagace, Ingram, and
Boorom‟s (1994) original 15-item scale measures buyer‟s perceptions of unethical
salesperson behavior and has an alpha coefficient of .91. Kaptein‟s (2008) 8-items from
the sales factor subscale of his original 37-item scale developed to measure unethical
behavior in the workplace has an alpha co-efficient of .93. The remaining two items
were adapted from Akaah and Lundh‟s (1994) analysis of Newstrom and Ruch‟s (1975)
scale of unethical workplace behavior based on suggestions by several business-tobusiness salespeople who assisted in the development of the Perceived Transparency
scale (Churchill 1979).
Agency Theory
Agency theory is a well-known business concept grounded in “economic
utilitarianism” (Ross 1973; Wright, Mukherjib, and Kroll 2001). It is an economic
theory, encapsulated and published by Stephen Ross in the American Economic Review
in 1973. According to Ross, agency theory addresses incentive problems and
compensation contracting, i.e., to create a compensation system that, "will produce
behavior by the agent consistent with the principal's preferences," (Mitnick 2006, p. 2).
The institutional theory of agency is credited to Barry Mitnick, who proposed that
institutions form around agency and that, "institutions and social mechanisms exist to
guide such behaviors," (Mitnick 2006, p. 3).
Agency theory addresses several key issues related to the struggle between
cooperation and self-interest within the relationship that exists when one party (the
principal) hires another party (the agent) to perform some task in exchange for a level of
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compensation agreed upon in advance. Agency theory has been applied to a range of
organizational business concerns including compensation (Eisenhardt 1985), vertical
integration (Anderson 1985), organizational strategy (Amihud and Lev 1981), and the
adoption and use of sales technology by salespeople (Mallin and DelVecchio 2007). As
Mallin and Delvecchio (2007) declare, “agency theory offers explanations of how the
boundary spanning positions affect the salesperson‟s perceptions . . . the agent‟s
(salesperson's) behavior is influenced by both his or her need for autonomy and the
principle‟s (sales manager‟s) need for control,” (p. 486). This particular study, centered
on salesperson behavior regarding the usage of sales force automation or information
technology tools, reported that salesperson behavior is predicated upon whom they
perceive the behavior will benefit most. Similarly, this dissertation‟s focus on the effect
of salesperson perceptions of management‟s use of technology to monitor and influence
salesperson ethical behaviors makes agency theory an ideal theoretical found
The goal of agency theory is to resolve problems that occur in this relationship,
such as agency problem where, "the principal cannot verify the agent has behaved
appropriately,” and (2) risk sharing, where “when the principal and the agent may prefer
different actions because of the different risk preferences,” (Eisenhardt 1985, p. 58).
These issues have also been referred to as moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral
hazard is defined as when the agent can take actions that affect the principal but that the
principal cannot monitor or enforce. Adverse selection is defined as when, “one party to
a transaction knows things which are relevant to the transaction but which are unknown
to the other party,” (Kurland 1996, p. 54). Bergen, Dutta, and Walker‟s (1992) agency
theory framework makes similar assumptions about both the principal and the agent.
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These include: (1) self-interest as a goal or motivator; (2) principals operate with
incomplete information regarding the actions and behaviors of the agent; (3) factors other
than the agent‟s behavior will impact outcomes; (4) the level of risk aversion of the
principle and the agent may differ (p. 3-4). A graphical model of agency theory is
presented in Figure 2.1 below.

Hires

SelfInterest

Principal

Agent

SelfInterest

Performs

FIGURE 2.1
Agency Theory Model

It is the principal‟s lack of available information about the agent that the
technology enabled transparency addresses. The systems that have been traditionally
available to sales managers for the monitoring of their sales force involved, “requiring
call reports, field observations by a sales manager, narrow spans of control, and the use of
behaviorally anchored rating scales,” (Bergen, Dutta, and White 1992, p. 4). These were
very costly and very limited. Although they could monitor the number of sales calls or
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presentations made, managers would not be able to be present for every one; they would
not know how the salesperson actually presented the materials, responded to questions, or
how the customers reacted (p. 4). Eisenhardt (1989) proposes that as the cost of
monitoring an agent‟s actions went down, the efficiency of a behavior-based approach to
the relationship between principal and agent would increase.
Sales technology has greatly reduced the financial and time costs involved in
monitoring salesperson behaviors and actions. For example, digital communications
organization Google has developed a system known as Postini for just such a purpose.
This software package offers organizations of any size the ability to outsource all of their
electronic communications, meaning every e-mail plus any attachment sent or received
by any company agent, for an extremely low per user fee. This service includes security
encryption of communications, scanning and filtering for viruses, as well as on-demand
storage by date, sender, recipient, subject, or any other possible parameter desired, for up
to 10 years of retention (www.google.com/postini/discovery). Similarly, software giant
Microsoft offers organizations its “Dynamics” software that includes customer resource
management (CRM) programming for sales departments. This product enables sales
managers to, “track all activities and interactions for each contact and account,”
(www.microsoft.com/ dynamics). These are just two examples of how sales technology
can make a principal‟s ability to monitor agent behavior more cost effective and thereby
create a more efficient relationship – the ultimate goal of agency theory (Eisenhardt
1989).
This research study proposes that the more a salesperson perceives their behaviors
to be transparent to sales management, the more ethical their behaviors will be; in other
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words, the desires and goals of the principal sales manager will be more influential over
salesperson ethical behavior than the agent salesperson‟s own desires and goals.
Salesperson Beliefs
Although agency theory can explain the positive influence of a salesperson‟s
perception of their behavioral transparency to technologically enabled management, their
personal beliefs regarding the performance of such unethical behaviors may moderate
this relationship. Therefore, the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen 1988) and the
Reasoned Action Approach (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010) and their recommended
measurement methods were integrated into this study.
The Theory of Planned Behavior. Fishbein and Ajzen‟s (1975) original Theory of
Reasoned Action proposed to be able to predict an individual‟s intention to perform a
specific behavior. Originally, this theory had only two dimensions: (1) behavioral
beliefs, addressing the individual's beliefs regarding the consequences of performing or
not performing a particular behavior; and (2) normative beliefs, regarding what others whose opinions and thoughts about the individual are important to the individual - would
think of the individual if they performed the behavior in question. A second concern is
what the individual believes those same others would do were they in similar
circumstances. A decade later, Ajzen (1985) expanded it to create the Theory of Planned
Behavior (TPB) by adding a third intent determinant to the original two prediction
criteria: control beliefs. This term refers to the person‟s, “perceived control over the
performance of the behavior,” (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010, p. 154). Control beliefs focus
on the individual‟s beliefs concerning personal and environmental elements that would
either expedite or hinder engagement in the activity or activities in question in relation to
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the individual‟s behavioral intentions. Control beliefs are rooted in self-efficacy, as
formulated in social cognitive theory (Bandura 1997).
TPB is a composite measurement of the direct perspective of the respondent,
depending on each of the three belief-oriented predictors of intention for its success.
Based on its ability to predict behavior, TPB was to measure the individual salesperson‟s
intent to perform unethical behaviors, despite having a high level of perceived
transparency (a possible environmental control factor). Figure 2.2 provides a graphical
representation of the Theory of Planned Behavior.
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FIGURE 2.2
Theory of Planned Behavior/Reasoned Action Approach

An investigation predicting dishonest behaviors among college students
successfully used the Theory of Planned Behavior as its theoretical foundation (Beck and
Ajzen 1991). The results indicated that when the measures for perceived behavioral
control (TPB) were added to attitude (behavioral beliefs) and subjective norms
(normative beliefs), anywhere from 62 to 69% of the variance was accounted for. The
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esteemed researchers appreciatively note in their concluding observations that
understanding what leads to the performance of deceitful and unethical behaviors can be
more difficult than why people perform socially desirable behaviors.
It is hypothesized in this study that a salesperson's individual beliefs towards
behavior understood to be unethical in nature, will influence their intent to perform it.
From a general perspective, it is expected that if that if a salesperson perceives his or her
actions and behaviors during the selling process are being monitored and are therefore
transparent to management, they are less likely to engage in unacceptable (unethical)
behavior. However, if they simultaneously perceive that they have control over this
behavior and its transparency to management, they may decide to engage in it despite its
possibly being visible to authority. Perhaps they believe they can control managerial
access to (thus preventing managerial use of) relevant behavioral information.
Salesperson Job Performance
Salesperson job performance has been described as a function of the combination
of motivation, aptitude, and perceptions regarding how to sell (Walker, Churchill, and
Ford 1977). The view that an employee‟s ethical decision-making is also to be regarded
as, “an aspect of his or her job performance,” is increasing in popularity (Valentine et al.
2010, p. 196). It is a more common position in research studies for job performance to be
an endogenous, or dependent, variable rather than as an independent moderator variable
that can change the form of the relationship between some other independent variable and
performance (Hair et al. 2006). It has, however, been used as a moderating variable in
studies on determinants of job turnover (Futrell and Parasuraman 1984; Lucas, Babakus,
and Ingram 1990; McNeilly and Russ 1992).
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Churchill et al.‟s (1985) heavily cited meta-analysis of performance determinants
finds several factors that impact salesperson job performance, including skill, role
variables, aptitude, and motivation. The findings also reveal that what is sold can
determine how strong the relationship is between the specific determinant and the
salesperson‟s performance. Twenty years later Jamarillo, Mulki, and Marshall‟s (2005)
meta-analysis find that although organizational commitment (defined as an employee‟s
intention to continue working there and their attitude towards the organization), “only
explains about 6% of the variance in salesperson job performance,”(p. 711), it supports
Churchill et al. (1985). More importantly, they show the correlation between
organizational commitment and job performance is, “stronger for sales than for non-sales
positions” (p. 711).
Among the research topics covered in salesperson job performance is one
common to the Theory of Planned Behavior: self-efficacy; that salespeople perform
better when they feel they have the ability and proficiency to succeed) (Barling and
Beattie 1983). This study of 200 insurance sales agents found self-efficacy beliefs
predicted insurance salesperson job performance better than response-outcome
expectation.
The influence of job performance and job satisfaction on a range of other workrelated variables has been a popular research topic. Côté (1999) found that affect (the
key basis for attitude, or behavioral beliefs, under the Reasoned Action Approach) is a
better predictor variable of job performance than job satisfaction is and that positive
performance results in positive effect, as well. Bagozzi‟s (1980) research into the
relationship between job performance and job satisfaction among industrial salespeople
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showed job performance had, “18% more impact on job satisfaction than does
achievement motivation” (p. 76). Further, the study indicates anticipated satisfaction
associated with job performance is a stronger motivator of salespeople than job
performance itself.
Schwepker and Ingram (1996) recognize that increasing pressure on salespeople
to perform could be a catalyst for unethical behavior. Their investigation into the
relationship between moral judgment (ethics) and job performance of salespeople defines
moral judgment as, “an individual‟s decision as to whether something is considered
ethical or unethical” (p. 1152). It notes that honest and ethical salespeople are more
likely to improve their performance by focusing on and building relationships with
customers, and, consequently, making sales. Support is found for their hypothesis that a
salesperson‟s moral judgment positively relates to their job performance. Salespeople
whose decision-making and behavior is more ethical tend to have higher levels of
performance.
Further, it has been shown that sales organizations could benefit from the use of
behavior-based sales control systems, as examining salesperson behaviors towards
creating and maintaining strong relationships with clients is a very important aspect of
salesperson job performance (Anderson and Oliver 1987; Hunter and Perreault 2007).
Although objective measures such as units sold or their dollar value are certainly
desirable, it is unlikely that companies whose salespeople are participating in this study
would voluntarily supply this information.
A conceptual definition of salesperson job performance is, “behavior evaluated in
terms of its contribution to the goals of the organization,” (Brown and Peterson 1994;
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Johnston and Marshall 2006, p. 412; Hunter and Perreault 2007). Its operationalization is
how well a salesperson performs his or her duties related to two key elements of
achieving organizational goals: building relationships with customers and the completion
of requisite administrative duties. Measurement will be accomplished using a composite
multidimensional scale, including items from a scale adapted by Hunter and Perreault
(2007) designed to measure subjective administrative performance and relationshipbuilding performance with customers, which includes several items from Behrman and
Perreault‟s (1982) scale for measuring salesperson job performance.
Salesperson job performance then should have a moderating effect on the
relationship between use of information and the likelihood of unethical salesperson
behavior, altering the level of the association (Hair et al. 2006).
Hypotheses
This section provides the proposed model linkages between the two dimensions of
perceived salesperson transparency (salesperson perceived managerial access to
information as enabled by technology and salesperson perceived use of information
access by technology-enabled management) and the likelihood of unethical salesperson
behavior. It also discusses the proposed moderating effects of Perceived Salesperson
Control Beliefs and Perceived Salesperson Job Performance on the mediating effect of
salesperson perceived use of information access by technology-enabled management on
the relationship between salesperson perceived managerial access to information as
enabled by technology and the likelihood of unethical salesperson behavior. A graphical
representation of the relationships of the three hypotheses is shown in Figure 2.3 at the
end of this chapter.
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Perceived Salesperson Transparency Enabled by Technology. The relationship
between salespeople and their managers is an agency relationship in that
salespeople/agents have been contracted to perform certain duties on behalf of their
principal employer, to be supervised by their managers (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker
1992). One of the problems inherent in agency relationships is the lack of financial and
labor cost effective information regarding the behaviors and actions of the agent while in
the employ of the principal. That salespeople typically work unmonitored or
unsupervised is well documented as a source of great potential trouble in the form of
unethical behaviors (Ferrell and Gresham 1985; Weitz, Castleberry, and Tanner 2008).
Recent developments in technology have provided both help and hindrance to the areas
of Sales and Sales Ethics with salespeople using it to exploit customers while sales
managers attempt to control the selling process and their sales forces with it
simultaneously (Bush et al. 2007). It has also been shown that higher ethical salesperson
decision-making and behaviors is positively correlated with higher salesperson
performance (Schwepker and Ingram 1996). Eisenhardt (1989) proposed that lower
monitoring costs would lead to more monitoring and, consequently, more behavior-based
principal-agent relationships than outcome-based. Hunter and Perrault (2007) note a
clear difference between using sales technology for accessing information and using sales
technology for communicating information. As their work concentrated on separate
dimensions for sales technology utilization, this present research addresses the impact of
the application of sales technology in these dimensions.
When a third variable or construct intercedes between two other related variables
or constructs, a mediating effect takes place. Researchers often investigate for the
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presence of mediators (also referred to as intervening variables) in order to develop a
fuller knowledge of, and to help enhance the explanation of, existing or hypothesized
relationships (Cheung and Lau 2008). In practice, significant correlation must be present
between all three variables or constructs (Warner 2008). In theory, this type of effect
should advance, or even clear the way for, the relationship between the original two
variables or constructs (Hair et al. (2006). Mediating variables are described as,
"conditions, states, or other factors that intervene between the independent variable and
the outcome variable in a causal chain" (Rosenthal and Rosnow, 2008 p. 205). Baron and
Kenny's (1986) define a variable as a mediator to, "the extent that it accounts for the
relation between the predictor and the criterion," (p. 1176). Therefore, it is expected that
the variable 'salesperson perceived managerial use of information accessed by
technology-enabled management' will serve as a mediator of the relationship between the
variables salesperson perceived managerial access to information, as enabled by
technology, and likelihood of unethical salesperson behavior. This expectation, as with
hypothesis two, stems from the comments of several business-to-business salespeople
during the early stages of this research. The implication is that the likelihood of unethical
salesperson behavior is only significantly impacted by salesperson perceptions of
management's technology-enabled access to information related to salesperson behavior
if there is the accompanying perception that such information could or would be used by
management either for or against the salesperson. This leads to the first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1:

Salesperson perceived managerial use of information
has a mediating effect on the relationship between
salesperson perceived managerial access to
information as enabled by technology and the
likelihood of unethical salesperson behavior.
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Salesperson Job Performance as a Moderator. The moderating variable
preferably is not correlated with either the independent or the dependent variable and is
always an independent variable (Baron and Kenny 1986). Strong job performance either subjective, such as customer relationship management or objective, such as
commission earned or sales goals met - provides job security for salespeople. This
occurs for a variety of reasons including the potential loss or cannibalization of customers
should the salesperson leave, especially to work for a competing firm (Weitz,
Castleberry, and Tanner 2008). Strong performers are believed to be less likely to fear
losing their jobs over subjective issues such as ethics (DeConinck and Lewis 1997).
These individuals tend to have a teleological orientation in the performance of their
duties; getting the sale is more important to them than how they get it. Salesperson job
performance has been shown to have an effect on whether, and to what extent, a
salesperson‟s behavior is considered punishable by management (Hunt and VasquezParraga 2006). It is conceivable that ethically questionable behavior may be one of the
underlying reasons for the seller‟s strong (or weak) performance.
Transparency makes the behaviors of all salespeople more visible to management,
which is expected to drive behavior that is more ethical. Yet, high job performance by a
salesperson may provide a perceived level of insulation from reprimand or punishment
for ethically unacceptable behavior (Bellizzi and Hite 1989; DeConinck and Lewis 1997).
McNeilly and Russ (1992) showed how sales force job performance acted as a
moderating variable between attitude (towards their job) and turnover intent. Futrell and
Parasuraman‟s (1984) research study of over 200 salespeople found that low performing
salespeople experience pressures to improve performance or risk termination, while high
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performers not only did not face such pressures but received rewards and positive
feedback. Increased pressure on low-performing salespeople to improve their
performance could lead to an increased temptation to engage in undesirable behavior
(Ferrell, Fraedrich, and Ferrell 2008). Subsequently, the increased potential in the
likelihood of unethical salesperson behavior increases the need for increased access to
information related to salesperson behavior in order to be able to use such information,
leads to Hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2:

Salesperson Job Performance will moderate the relationship
between salespersons perceptions that management will use
information gained through information technology and
salesperson unethical behavior, SUCH THAT the negative
relationship will be weaker for higher performing salespeople.

Salesperson Control Beliefs as a Moderating Variable. Fishbein and Ajzen‟s
Theory of Reasoned Action (1975), Ajzen's Theory of Planned Behavior (1985), and
Fishbein and Ajzen's Reasoned Action Approach (2010), claim that individual behavior
is predictable, and therefore, manageable or controllable. Their initial theory of reasoned
action (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975, 1980) proposed two determinants: behavioral beliefs
(i.e., attitude toward the behavior) and normative beliefs (i.e., what others would think of
the actor for performing the behavior in question). Behavioral beliefs involve the
subjective probability that performing a certain behavior leads to a certain consequence.
Normative beliefs involve perceived social pressures to perform or not perform a
particular behavior. A decade later, Ajzen (1985) added a third determinant - control
beliefs - which focus perceived control of behavioral performance with regard to personal
and/or environmental factors that could make performing the behavior in question either
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easier or more difficult. TRA/TPB/RAA tells us that behavior is more likely to be
performed the stronger the perceived social pressure to perform is.
It is hypothesized, therefore, that a salesperson's individual beliefs towards
behavior understood to be unethical in nature, will influence their intent to perform it.
From a general perspective, it is expected that if that if a salesperson perceives his or her
actions and behaviors during the selling process are being monitored and are therefore
transparent to management, they are less likely to engage in unacceptable (unethical)
behavior. However, if they simultaneously perceive that they have control over this
behavior and its transparency to management, they may decide to engage in it despite its
possibly being visible to authority. Perhaps they believe they can control managerial
access to (thus preventing managerial use of) relevant behavioral information. This led to
the third hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3:

Salesperson Beliefs will moderate the relationship between
salespersons perceptions that management will use information
gained through information technology and salesperson unethical
behavior, SUCH THAT the negative relationship will be weaker
for salespeople with higher control beliefs.
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Hypotheses Model of the Effect of Perceived Salesperson Transparency
as Enabled by Technology on Unethical Salesperson Behavior.
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Chapter Three
Methodology
Chapter Three provides the methodological details of this research study. It
outlines the direction and goals of this project with regard to its overall design, the
collection of data, as well as the statistical procedures involved in the testing of the
different research hypotheses. More specifically, this chapter discusses the process that
was followed in identifying and utilizing the particular scales that were chosen to
measure the constructs of perceived salesperson transparency, unethical salesperson
behavior, control beliefs, and salesperson job performance. Additionally, it provides an
analysis of the obtained statistical results for both the small-scale and large-scale
measures as they pertain to each of the study's hypotheses and correlations.
Measures
Chonko et al. (1996) claim scenarios have been the “foundation for ethics
research in marketing” (p. 35). Alexander and Becker (1978) point out scenarios create a
more realistic situation for respondents. Jaramillo et al. (2003) found in their
investigation that salespersons‟ self-reported performance evaluations tends to be
curvilinear, with bottom performers overestimating their performance and top salespeople
underestimating theirs. Despite the traditional use of scenarios to measure ethics in sales
research, attempting to reduce the infinite number of possible scenarios involving
salespeople and their beliefs regarding behavioral determinants and consequences is too
great to be equitably scripted into a handful of examples as representative of the entire
population of possibilities. With as many situational variations as are experienced by
salespeople across a range of industries, fields, products, services, backgrounds, ethical
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climates, etc. preconceived scenario-based measures would be too inflexible, thus the
decision to use self-reporting measures. Established scales have been adapted wherever
and whenever required to maintain integrity, thus facilitating comparisons and
generalizations with other sales or ethics research (Hensel and Bruner 1992).
Self-report scales are an accepted means of obtaining information about
individual or group beliefs regarding behaviors, especially given the lack of practical
alternatives (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). However, it is recognized that self-presentation
biases are a legitimate concern, especially when dealing with socially desirable or
undesirable behaviors. Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) urge researchers to be aware of the
possible threats to the validity by using behavioral self-reporting methods and to do what
can be done to increase reporting accuracy to its fullest. They recommend encouraging
respondents to be honest, to stress the confidentiality and anonymity of their participation
and emphasizing the scientific importance of their being accurate in their responses.
Several research studies have been successfully conducted where self-reporting of ethical
behavior was employed (Himmelfarb and Lickteig 1982; Beck and Ajzen 1991). A copy
of the scale items used in the pretest survey is provided in Appendix A. The revised final
survey version is available in Appendix B.
Perceived Salesperson Transparency. A review of the available academic Sales
literature was conducted in an attempt to discover if any scales existed that were designed
to measure perceived transparency. Several scales designed to measure concepts
associated with management‟s use of technology for the accessing and monitoring of
employee information for evaluative purposes were found. Chalykoff and Kochan (1989)
measured employee attitude towards “computer-aided” monitoring and its impact on
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employee turnover and job satisfaction. Oz, Glass, and Behling‟s (1999) research
utilized an original 8-item Likert-style scale to obtain employee opinions of electronic
workplace monitoring, but this work did not include employees' perceptions as to
whether they themselves were being monitored. Greenberg and Barling (1999) created a
scale that utilizes seven different forms of monitoring (time cards, punch cards, sign-in
sheets, etc.). The monitoring measured here, again, is more for evaluative purposes than
for behavioral surveillance. Alge (2001) investigated the effects of computer surveillance
on employee perceptions of invasion of privacy in the workplace issues. A few years
later, Alge et al. (2006) developed an information privacy scale based on previous scales
items (E.F. Stone et al. 1983) to examine employee perceptions of management‟s right to
gather personal (i.e., not work-related) information within their work organizations.
These studies emphasize technology-based monitoring of employees, but do not define or
expound upon the idea of transparency.
It is worth noting here that Saxe and Weitz's (1982) milestone SOCO scale, one of
the earlier instruments designed for measuring salesperson attributes, lists seven different
characteristics of customer-oriented selling, based on the existing literature and
interviews with 25 sales managers and salespeople (p. 344). Yet, it does not include
either transparency directly or any indirect term that could be interpreted as the
equivalent of transparency as a basic attribute of customer-orientation. Twenty years
later, however, company transparency is considered a crucial element of the multidimensional CUSTOR scale, which is designed to measure the customer orientation of a
company (Hajjat 2002). In 2003, Eggert and Helm developed a cross-sectional survey
designed to measure the impact of transparency on business relationships as perceived by

54

organizational purchasers.
Given the absence of an established scale, it was decided that a new scale for
measuring perceived salesperson transparency should be developed in accordance with
the processes set forth by Nunnally (1978), Churchill (1979), Saxe and Weitz (1982), and
Hunter and Perrault (2007). Business-to-business salespeople were contacted through a
variety of approaches, including the telephone, e-mail, and private Sales-oriented
discussion boards on-line to help determine and clarify how salespeople view the concept
of transparency. Their input and insight was solicited regarding how they define
transparency as it related to their profession and what impact technology (i.e., GPS, email access, keystroke tracking, etc.) has on their transparency to their managers and if it
influences their behavior? From these conversations, development of a 50-item scale
designed to measure perceived salesperson transparency composed of items inspired by
and grounded in the comments and observations provided from these industry experts as
well as from established scales, including the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM)
(Davis 1989; Venkatesh and Davis 2000) was started. It also involved adaptations from
Alge‟s (2006) information privacy scale designed to measure an individual's perception
of their ability to control managerial access to personal information.
While reviewing applicable existing literature to aid in the development of this
new scale, an established scale measuring the extent of behavior-based sales management
control (Cravens et al. 1993; Babakus et al. 1996) was found in the literature. Although
the items were intended for sales manager respondents, it was determined that it was
adaptable for front-line salespeople. Item alpha coefficients all met the minimal
requirements for reliability with coefficient alphas in excess of .70. The original eight
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items of this scale (Cravens et al. 1993; Babakus et al. 1996) are in Appendix C. Adapted
items from the established scale and items generated from discussions with salespeople
during the development of the intended new scale comprised the scale that used in the
survey. The result was a 10-item, seven-point Likert style scale, anchored by 'not at all'
and 'very much'. The construct of perceived salesperson transparency as enabled by
technology consists of two dimensions: 1) salesperson perceptions of management's
technology-enabled ability to access information related to salesperson behavior and 2)
salesperson perceptions regarding how management uses the information accessed. The
adapted scale represent these two dimensions in order to obtain a more complete measure
of perceived salesperson transparency as enabled by technology.
Unethical Salesperson Behavior. Salesperson ethical behavior was measured
using an adapted version of Lagace, Ingram, and Boorom‟s (1994) established one
dimensional scale designed to measure customer or client perceptions of unethical
salesperson behavior, defined as, “that set of actions on the part of the salesperson which
may be perceived as right, just, or morally correct,” (p. 119). It focuses on behaviors
such as lying, providing false reports or answers, high-pressure sales techniques, and
misrepresenting the item being sold.
The behaviors represented in the Lagace, Ingram, and Boorom (1994) scale are
almost identical to other scale items exemplified as unethical salesperson behavior in the
existing sales literature, such as deception or falsification (Newstrom and Ruch, 1975;
Honeycutt et al. 2001; Román 2003; Kaptein 2008; Hansen and Riggle 2009). The
adapted version is designed to measure the perceived likelihood of salespeople engaging
in, or performing, unethical behaviors. After discarding items directed towards retail
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salespeople (not the focus of this research), the final version features eight of the scale's
original 15 items in a 7 point Likert-style format where one equals 'not likely' and seven
equals 'very likely' (Bearden and Netemeyer 1999). The original version has an overall
scale reliability of α =.91 (Bearden and Netemeyer 1999), easily surpassing the low-end
criteria for acceptable levels of reliability (Nunnally 1978; Peter 1979).
Salesperson Beliefs. Fishbein and Ajzen stress that their Reasoned Action
Approach (2010) requires a composite of three separate types of individual beliefs:
behavioral, normative, and control. This section discusses the methodology utilized for
measuring each type of belief. It is hypothesized that positive or negative salesperson
beliefs towards the performance of unethical behavior will have moderating effects on the
relationships between different levels of perceived salesperson transparency and the
likelihood of unethical performance.
Behavioral Beliefs. Behavioral beliefs, or outcome expectancies, are the beliefs
about potential consequences of performing (or not performing) a particular behavior.
The possible resulting outcomes are evaluated as being positive or negative. They are
“assumed to determine people‟s attitude toward personally performing the behavior,”
(Fishbein and Ajzen 2010, p. 20). It is the attitude toward performing the behavior in
question that is measured; does the performer have a favorable or unfavorable evaluation
of the behavior.
In accordance with the recommendations made by Fishbein and Ajzen (2010)
regarding the measuring of attitudes towards performing the behavior in question
(behavioral beliefs), a semantic differential scale was used in the initial pretest with bipolar adjectives measuring the subject‟s overall evaluation of performing the action
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(Oliver and Bearden 1985; Bruner, Hensel, and James 2005). A scale established by
Beck and Ajzen (1991) and utilized by Harding et al. (2007) with a suitable reliability
coefficient of .84 (Nunnally 1978; Peter 1979) that used to measure dishonest actions
among college students was adapted for use with salespeople for this specific study. The
semantic adjectives used to describe specific examples of unethical behavior (Fishbein
and Ajzen 2010) are foolish/wise, unsafe/safe, harmful/beneficial, punishing/rewarding,
and unfavorable/ favorable.
Normative Beliefs. Normative beliefs are those that an individual has regarding
perceived social pressure of others, some whose opinions matter and some whose
opinions do not matter quite as much. As the theory's founders write, “the stronger the
perceived social pressure, the more likely it is that an intention to perform the behavior
will be formed,” (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010, p. 130). There are two types of normative
beliefs: injunctive and descriptive. Injunctive norms deal with what the performer
believes the opinions of others who are important to him or her will be should the
behavior in question be performed. Descriptive norms are concerned with beliefs the
performer has about whether those significant referent others would perform the behavior
if they were in the same or a similar position as that of the performer (2010). The
measure of normative beliefs in this study will concentrate solely on injunctive norms.
As with behavioral beliefs, a seven-point semantic differential scale was adapted
from existing work (Beck and Ajzen 1991; Harding et al. 2007). The coefficient alpha's
for the normative belief scales used to measure cheating, shoplifting, and lying in Beck
and Ajzen's (1991) research showed acceptable reliability levels of .81, .73, and .83
respectively (Nunnally 1978). An example of a normative belief item is, “The people in
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my life whose opinion matters to me would be willing to lie about the competition if they
were in a similar situation.”
Control Beliefs. Control beliefs were defined earlier as an individual‟s beliefs
about, “personal or environmental factors that can help facilitate or impede their attempts
to carry out the behavior,” (Fishbone and Ajzen 2010, p. 21). The measure of these
beliefs followed the same approach used with the other two types (Beck and Ajzen 1991;
Harding et al. 2007) - a 7-point semantic differential scale anchored by false and true.
Beck and Ajzen (1991) and Harding et al. (2007) reported satisfactory levels of reliability
with coefficients of α = .70 and .71 respectively (Nunnally 1978; Peter 1979).
It is important to note that there is a key difference with the items measuring
control beliefs. These items require responses based on the respondent's beliefs of others
(i.e., "Salespeople have…" or "…a salesperson could not…"), whereas behavioral and
normative belief items require responses based on the respondent's beliefs of himself or
herself (i.e., "Deceiving a client…" or "The people in my life…"). One example of an
item to measure control belief is, “Salespeople have a great deal of control over whether
they give or receive gifts or favors in exchange for preferential treatment.”
Salesperson Job Performance. This study hypothesizes that salesperson job
performance will have a moderating effect on the relationships between perceived
salesperson transparency and the likelihood of unethical salespeople behavior. Several
different scales have been used over the years to measure salesperson performance
(Berhman and Perreault, 1982; Schwepker and Ingram 1996; Hunter and Perreault 2007).
Churchill's (1985) meta-analysis found existing studies into salesperson performance
used either subjective or objective evaluations. A review of the literature shows these
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approaches tend to evaluate different things and are not interchangeable (Rich et al. 1999;
Dwyer, Hill, and Martin 2000). Therefore, this study will use two existing self-report
scales to measure job performance.
Salesperson perceived subjective performance, such as customer relationship
management and completing administrative duties will be measured using a scale
developed by Hunter and Perreault (2007). It is an eight-item 7-point Likert style scale
(where one equals “needs improvement” and seven equals “outstanding”). It includes
items adapted from “the rich literature on sales performance and blended them with new
items to reflect modern demands on salespeople,” (Hunter and Perreault 2007, p. 23).
Two of these items are originally from Behrman and Perrault‟s (1982) seminal scale on
sales performance designed to measure, respectively, sales presentations (traditionally an
unmonitored salesperson activity) and how well salespeople work with prospective or
established clients. The Hunter and Perreault (2007) scale reported an alpha reliability of
.82 for the items that measure customer performance; administrative performance
measures have an alpha reliability of .90. Both results substantiate the reliability of the
scale (Nunnally 1978).
Objective sales productivity is often the basis for managerial evaluation of
salesperson performance (Churchill, Ford, and Walker 1990; MacKenzie, Podsakoff, and
Fetter 1993). However, researchers experience great difficulty in obtaining objective
performance measures from organizations (Bommer et al.., 1995; Jaramillo et al.., 2005).
Subsequently, self-reported perceptions of objective measures are often used. The selfreporting scale that will be used to measure salesperson perceived objective
performance, such as commissions earned and the accomplishment of selling goals and
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targets, was created by Dwyer, Hill, and Martin (2000). It is a five-item, 7 point, Likertlike scale used to, “assess salesperson relative performance within the sales organization
(with one equaling „far below average‟ and seven equaling „far above average),” (p. 152).
Dwyer, Hill, and Martin (2000) reported a coefficient alpha of .81 for this scale, thus
sufficiently meeting reliability requirements (Nunnally 1978). An objective performance
item would ask respondents to rate themselves regarding an area such as exceeding sales
objectives and targets.
Social Desirability. Social desirability is defined as individuals under-reporting
their activities or behaviors that they feel may be looked down upon or seen as
undesirable by society or, on the other end of the spectrum, over-reporting activities and
behaviors the perceive society valuing (Crowne and Marlowe 1960; Ganster et al. 1983).
Recognizing that social desirability bias is highly likely when measuring subjective
topics, such as ethics, Crowne and Marlowe‟s (1960) designed a scale to measure the
degree to which individuals use socially acceptable terms to describe themselves in hopes
of obtaining the approval (or avoid the disapproval) of others. However, despite the
limited number of alternate options for measurement, it does not have a flawless
reputation.
Randall and Fernandes (1991) researched the impact of social desirability
response bias in self-reported ethical behavior, the type that proposed in this research.
Their findings indicate that self-reported ethical conduct is associated with personality
characteristics and is most influenced by, “the perceived desirability of behavior,” (p.
805). They found that although the Crowne and Marlowe scale (1962) had significant
correlation with self-reported ethical behavior, it failed to make any significant

61

contribution towards predicting ethical conduct. As an alternative, the Balanced
Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) (Pauhlus 1991) is preferred by researchers
investigating social desirability as a personality characteristic. The BIDR consists of a
set of 20 items to measure impression management (purposeful self-presentation) and 20
items to measure self-deception (a believed positivistic bias). Impression management,
the dimension of concern in this study, is designed to assess the degree to which
individuals deliberately inflate the inclination to engage in desirable rather than
undesirable behaviors. The items used to measure this describe concrete observable acts.
Ten of the twenty items developed to measure impression management will be used in
this research survey (only half are used here in order to avoid demanding too much of the
respondents) to measure for the existence of social desirability bias in the responses.
Examples include "I never swear" or "I sometimes lie if necessary" (reverse coded)
(Pauhlus 1991). The impression management section of the BIDR scale reported an
alpha coefficient of .83 (Pauhlus 1983) which supports the reliability of the BIDR scale
for assessing intentional self-presentation to others (Nunnally 1978).
Pre-Test of Measurement Scales
Although the measurement scales used in this study were previously established
for other studies, their reliability was empirically confirmed through pre-testing with
respondents similar to those who would be used for the primary dissertation data
collection and analysis. In addition to ensuring scale reliability, preliminary correlations
between the proposed relationships were also observed as part of the pre-test. Businessto-business salespeople were solicited by the study's author, as well as through a
professional market research organization that performs nation-wide, pre-screened panel-
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based surveys, to participate in the pre-testing phase. Twenty-nine usable responses were
received.
Reliability is defined as, "the assessment of the degree of consistency between
multiple measures of a variable" (Hair et al. 2006, p. 137). This was achieved through
two types of measures. The item-to-total correlation was tested first (which should
exceed .50) followed by an analysis of the inter-item correlation (the minimal level of
acceptance is one greater than .30). The next analytic measure checked was the
reliability coefficient. According to Hair et al. (2006) the consensus regarding the lowend level of acceptance for this coefficient is .70, although .60 may be allowed for
exploratory research (Robinson et al. 1991). Reliability tests of the pre-test measures
were run using SPSS v. 14. The results of the reliability analyses for each measurement
scale, the three subscales for Salesperson Beliefs, and the two subscales for Salesperson
Job Performance are given in Table 3.1 below.

TABLE 3.1
Pre-Test Reliability Coefficients
Scale Name
Perceived Salesperson Transparency
- Access
- Use
Unethical Salesperson Behaviors
Salesperson Beliefs*
- Behavioral beliefs
- Normative beliefs
- Control beliefs*
Salesperson Job Performance
- Subjective
- Objective
Social Desirability

Items
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10
1, 3, 5, 6
2, 8, 9, 10
11 - 18
19 - 52
19 - 38
39 - 44
45 - 52 (46 - 51)
53 - 65
53 - 60
61 - 65
66 - 75
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Alpha
0.84
0.75
0.88
0.90
0.74
0.88
0.69
0.61
0.91
0.83
0.92
0.75

Perceived Salesperson Transparency. Cravens et al.'s (1993) and Babakus et al.'s
(1996) measure of sales manager's behavior-based control of salespeople was adapted for
this research to evaluate salesperson perceptions of their own transparency to
management given technology's enabling of management to increase salesperson
behavioral transparency. Each of the 29 pre-test respondents completed the 10 item, 7point scale (anchored by 'not at all' to 'very much'). The reliability coefficient for the
perceived salesperson transparency scale was .86, which meets the acceptable reliability
criteria of .70 or higher (Nunnally 1978; Peter 1979).
It was briefly considered to assess perceived salesperson transparency as a multidimensional scale instead of as a unidimensional one. Several of the salespeople who
provided insight for the early phases of developing a new scale to measure this construct
saw transparency to clients (external) as being different from transparency to
management (internal). However, this study focuses on the influence of how technology
has enabled management to better monitor, increase the accountability of, and limit the
empowerment of their sales force (Bush et al. 2007). Therefore, it was determined to
keep this scale unidimensional, at least for the pre-test.
Unethical Salesperson Behaviors. All salesperson respondents in the pre-test
were asked to respond to an eight-item scale adapted from Lagace, Ingram, and Boorom's
(1994) unidimensional, 15-item scale designed to measure how likely they thought
salespeople in general were to perform various unethical behaviors (Bearden and
Netemeyer 1999). Items in the original that pertained to retail sales were removed in
order to narrow its scope to behaviors more applicable to field salespeople. The items
were measured on a scale anchored by one equaling 'not likely' and seven equaling 'very
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likely'. The coefficient alpha for the 8-item unethical salesperson behavior scale was α =
.90 indicating the scale is extremely reliable for assessing the likelihood of salespeople
performing unethical behaviors in the performance of their job (Nunnally 1978; Peter
1979).
Salesperson Beliefs. The recommendations set forth by Fishbein and Ajzen
(2010) for obtaining self-reported measures of the three dimensions of Reasoned
Action/Planned Behavior were followed in the pre-test phase of this research study.
Respondents were provided with a 34-item scale (numbers 19 - 52) adapted from an
existing study (Beck and Ajzen 1991) designed to measure the behavioral, normative, and
control beliefs surrounding the likelihood of college students to perform the behaviors of
cheating, stealing, and lying. For this specific research study, two specific unethical
behaviors - deceiving clients and submitting false information to management - were
chosen based on discussions with the professional B2B salespeople assisting with the
earlier scale development.
Behavior Beliefs. To measure behavior beliefs, six separate semantic differential
items specifying two types of unethical behavior were used. The first item for each
behavior had five subparts to it, thus, resulting in 20 separate items (numbers 19 - 38) to
be responded to in order to measure respondent's beliefs about the behaviors in question.
Respondents were instructed to think only of themselves and no other salespeople in
responding to these items. Pre-test results show that the coefficient alpha for the
behavioral belief scale was .88 and met the acceptable minimum for scale reliability
(Nunnally 1978; Peter 1979).
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Normative Beliefs. Normative beliefs were measured using a scale consisting of
six statements (three for each specific type of unethical salesperson behavior), items 39 44. They were followed by a 7-point semantic differential scale (Care/Not Care,
Okay/Not Okay, Would/Would Not) to measure the respondent's perception of how those
people who matter to the respondent would react if the respondent performed the
unethical behaviors. These items were also adapted from the scale developed by Beck
and Ajzen (1991). The reliability coefficient for the normative belief scale was initially
.69, but the removal of two items from the original scale led to the coefficient increasing
to .83, which is a satisfactory level for scale reliability (Nunnally 1978; Peter 1979).
Control Beliefs. This final measure of salesperson beliefs was obtained in similar
fashion to those of normative beliefs. Four statements, items 45 - 52, regarding each
specific type of unethical salesperson behavior were adapted from Beck and Ajzen
(1991), followed by a 7-point semantic differential scale (False/True). The items were
designed to measure respondents' perceptions about how much control salespeople have
in performing the two specific types of unethical salesperson behaviors. Coefficient
alpha for these eight items was originally .61, but following the recommended removal of
two pre-test items (45 and 52) resulted in a stronger reliability coefficient of .73, which
qualifies as an acceptable amount of reliability (Nunnally 1978; Peter 1979). This
adjustment also resulted in a slightly stronger coefficient alpha for the entire Salesperson
Belief scale, increasing it from .74 to .76.
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Salesperson Job Performance. Salesperson job performance was measured using
two different established scales - one for subjective performance and one for objective
performance. Eight items from a scale developed by Hunter and Perreault (2007) was
adapted to measure subjective salesperson performance. Using a seven-point Likert-style
scale where one equals 'needs improvement' and seven equals 'outstanding,' respondents
were asked to rate themselves on a range of subjective performance issues (i.e., customer
relations and administrative duties). The reliability coefficient for the subjective
measures was .83, exceeding the established minimal requirement for scale reliability of
0.70 (Nunnally 1978; Peter 1979).
Given the infeasibility of obtaining actual sales performance data from the
organizations employing the respondent salespeople, the respondents were asked to
evaluate their performance in objective performance areas such as commissions earned,
goal attainment, and new account creation. The five items utilized were adapted from a
scale developed by Dwyer, Clark, and Martin (2000). The pre-test coefficient alpha
obtained for this scale was .92, suggesting that these items are very reliable for
salesperson self-assessment of the objective aspect of their job performance.
Correlations of Proposed Relationships
Whereas it is understood that correlation does not imply causality, basic
correlation analysis can provide a clearer understanding of the direction and strength of
the relationship between two or more variable. The correlations of the two subdimensions of perceived salesperson transparency - salesperson perceived managerial
access to information as enabled by technology and salesperson perceived managerial use
of information accessed by technology-enabled management with the likelihood of
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unethical salesperson behavior are provided in Table 3.2. The results indicate that
although there is not significant correlation in the pre-test between access to information
and unethical behavior, there is significant correlation between the perceived use of that
information and salesperson behavior. This result caused a shift in how use of
information is perceived relative to behavior. Initially, it was thought that perceived
access would have the greater influence on the likelihood of unethical performance, but
the pre-test correlations show otherwise. Not surprisingly, a positive relationship is
evidenced between access to information and use of information. What is surprising is
that it is not significant or not any stronger than it is. As discussed previously, and
supported by this result, how transparency is viewed by individuals may be worth
pursuing further.

TABLE 3.2
Pre-Test Correlations of Access to Information and Use of Information
(i.e., Perceived Salesperson Transparency) and Unethical Salesperson Behavior

Access to
information
1
0.278

Use of
information

Unethical SP
Behavior

Access to information
Use of information
1
Unethical Salesperson
Behavior
-0.545
-.902*
* Indicates significant correlation at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

1

Pre-Test Results
All scales and sub-scales met the required levels of acceptable reliability, with
coefficient alphas ranging from .73 to .92 (Nunnally 1978; Peter 1979). The pre-test
results led to the conclusion that the original construct Perceived Salesperson
68

Transparency should be measured as two separate dimensions: 1) salesperson perceived
managerial access to information, as enabled by technology and 2) salesperson perceived
managerial use of information accessed by technology-enabled management. The
correlation results obtained from the pilot test show preliminary empirical support for the
relationships proposed in the hypotheses as both dimensions had acceptable levels of
reliability, as shown earlier in Table 3.1.
The most severe flaw revealed through the pre-test was with the adapted scales to
measure behavioral beliefs and normative beliefs in accordance with the Theory of
Planned Behavior and the Reasoned Action Approach (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). These
were the only scales in the entire pre-test where the respondents were asked to base their
response on themselves and not on salespeople in general. The limited range of
responses received during the pre-test led to the decision to omit these two scale
dimensions from the primary data collection; Table 3.3 below shows the ranges of the
responses for the three sub-scales adapted to measure salesperson beliefs.
This decision was reached after discussions between the author of this dissertation
and the majority of its advisory committee. This conclusion is based on the recognition
that TPB/RAA scales were not designed for application to professional salespeople. It
was pointed out that the two research studies (Beck and Ajzen 1991; Harding et al. 2007)
that served as the basis for adaptation of the Theory of Planned Behavior and Reasoned
Action Approach (Fishbein and Ajzen 1977, 2010) to this research was focused on
college students who earned course credit for participation, not full-time working adult
salespeople.

69

Discussions with professional salespeople consultants who assisted in the early
development of a perceived transparency scale often commented that they knew more
about technology than their managers and could, therefore, control what information
could be accessed and what information could not. Therefore, for the primary research
study, it was concluded that the third perceived salesperson beliefs dimension, control
beliefs, (whose responses were not as heavily skewed as the other belief dimensions),
should be retained. As a result, for the structural equation modeling-based analysis of the
data, this latent moderating variable will be referred to as Perceived Salesperson Control
Beliefs. The academic motivation underlying its retention was to determine if high levels
of perceived salesperson control over managerial ability to access information would
have a moderating influence on the relationship between perceived salesperson
transparency and the likelihood of unethical behavior.

TABLE 3.3
Respondent Frequencies for Behavioral, Normative, and Control Beliefs
Salesperson Belief
Range of Scores
Percent
Behavioral Belief
Between 1-3
97
Normative Belief
Between 5-7
90
Control Belief
Between 3-6
83

Lastly, to determine if social desirability had any influence over the responses, ten
of the original twenty-items from Paulhus' (1991) Balanced Inventory Desired Response
scale were included in the survey. The reduction in scale size was for the sake of brevity
and parsimoniousness. A corrected item-to-total correlation test resulted in seven items
with values greater than 3.0 and an acceptable Cronbach's alpha of .78 (Nunnally 1978;
Peter 1979).
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Primary Research Design and Analysis
Discussions with fellow researchers - from doctoral candidates to fully tenured
professors - led to the decision to use a professional market research organization to
supply respondents for the primary collection of data to test the proposed relationships
presented in the hypotheses, as opposed to using more traditional postal or telephone
methods. Research of the organizations that offer this service led to the decision to select
Opinionology (www.opinionology.com) to handle data collection. Although this
approach differs from traditional methods, it is gaining in acceptance and approval
among researchers. It has been said that, "the Internet has democratized data collection,"
(Kraut et al. 2004 p. 106) and that questionnaires done on line are, "both flexible and less
error prone" (p. 107). The costs of online surveys are lower than customary collection
methods that involve printing and mailing/return mailing expenses (McDonald and Adam
2003; Kraut et al. 2004). Turnaround times and response speed are much faster than for
postal surveys (Adam and Deans 2000; Bachman et al. 2000). One research study found
more item-missing data in 80% of the demographic questions in postal surveys compared
to those completed on-line (McDonald and Adams 2003). Similarly, Basi's (1999)
research found respondents completing surveys online actually completed more questions
than those who filled out pencil-and-paper surveys mailed to them.
Pre-screened panels of business-to-business salespeople from a wide range of
industries, including advertising, finance, information technology, business consulting,
medical, and non-profits were contacted and asked to complete a revised on-line version
of the survey used for the pre-test phase of this study. A copy of the revised survey is
provided in Appendix B. A sample size of 300 was initially requested in order to obtain a
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sample size large enough to meet the requirements to test for statistical significance,
exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, and for effect size (Cohen, 1988; Harkin
1995; Hair et al. 2006). Hinkin (1995) claimed sample sizes of 150 should allow for an
accurate solution in exploratory analysis given strong inter-correlations (Guadagnoli and
Velicer 1988). Hair et al. (2006) states that a sample size of 250 will allow factor
loadings of .350 to be considered significant during analysis. Cohen (1988) reports that
for an effect size of .30 (slightly larger than effects categorized as small, i.e., ES = .2)
with a significance of .05, and a power level of .80, a minimum sample size of 175 is
required (Cohen 1988, p. 55). The demographic characteristics of the sample obtained
for the primary research study are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
Every survey instrument provided to the respondents contained an informed
consent statement in accordance with the requirements of the University's Institutional
Review Board. Respondents were required to supply the date of the day that they
complete the survey as an indication of their understanding that they were under no
obligation to participate, their responses were completely confidential, and that they
could withdraw at any time. All respondents supplied consent to participate without
incident or issue.
The questionnaire comprised three main sections. The first section asked
participants to respond based on their knowledge of salespeople in general, i.e., those
other than the respondents themselves. This section contained scales to measure
perceived salesperson transparency (both dimensions - access to information and use of
information), the likelihood of unethical salesperson behavior, and perceived salesperson
control belief. The second section focused on subjective and objective salesperson job
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performance, asking that respondents think only about themselves as salespeople and not
on any other salesperson. This portion of the survey also contained the scale for
measuring social desirability bias. Finally, the third section asked questions related to
respondent demographics (age, gender, education, etc.), sales experience, training, and
method of compensation. Responses that indicated professions other than sales were
eliminated from inclusion in the final data analysis.
Hypotheses Testing
The primary stage of any formal data examination is to assess the measures
utilized. The measures that involved multiple items were initially subjected to
exploratory factor analysis (EFA), followed by a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to
address the issues of reliability, dimensionality, convergent, and discriminant validity
(Anderson and Gerbing 1988; Joreskog and Sorbom 1993; Hair et al. 2006). Although
EFA and CFA both identify scale dimensionality, these methods are actually intended for
different purposes. The goal of EFA is one of discovery, where CFA's is one of
endorsement. EFA is a data-driven approach wherein, "all variables load on all factors,"
(Hox and Bechger 1998, p. 356). It allows the number and nature of the retained factors
to be determined by the sample data provided, instead of specifying the number of factors
or relationship patterns in advance, usually keeping only the factors that have an
Eigenvalue of at least 1.0, in keeping with the Kaiser-Gutterman rule (Hair et al. 2006;
Brown 2006). Confirmatory factor analysis, on the other hand, requires a strong
foundation - either empirical or theoretical - to direct the factor model; the model is
enacted upon the data (Warner 2008). This type of analysis traditionally begins with a
researcher's conceptual model supplying the number of indicators, latent variables, and
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the model itself in advance (Brown 2006; Hair, et al. 2006). The CFA was conducted
using structural equation modeling (SEM). The variance-covariance matrix is the
statistical basis for SEM. It provides a stronger and more thorough data analysis than
correlations that do not account for the variable standard deviation (Gau 2010). SEM
also generates fit indices that allow for a more detailed evaluation of the proposed model;
it also permits the examination of multiple dependent and mediating variables (Gau
2010). One of structural equation modeling's most vital uses in research is its ability to
verify the existence of construct validity through confirmatory factor analysis (Babin,
Hair, and Boles 2008).
Both exploratory and confirmatory analyses were performed using maximum
likelihood (ML) estimation (Babakus, Ferguson, and Jӧreskog 1987; Anderson and
Gerbing 1988). One of the primary advantages of ML estimation is its allowance for,
"statistical evaluation of how well the factor solution is able to reproduce the
relationships among the indicators," (Brown 2006, p. 21). ML was also selected due to
its ability to generate a range of fit indices to assist with the overall factor analyses
(Brown 2006). It has been stated that, "all fit indices are either a direct or indirect
function of the maximum likelihood loss function," (Babin, Hair, and Boles 2008, p.
282).
All three hypotheses were tested using structural equation modeling (SEM). This
approach is preferred among researchers as it accounts for measurement error in the
model, helping to avoid the subsequent risk of confusing or misleading results led to the
decision to re-run the data in SEM (Hair et al. 2006; Warner 2008). Hypothesis 1 claims
salesperson perceived use of information accessed by technology-enabled management
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has at least a partial mediating effect on the relationship access of information and the
likelihood of unethical behavior. A chi-square difference test was conducted to
determine if there was any difference between the partially mediated and fully mediated
models. SEM is the favored technique to determine if mediation effects exist using a
two-step process (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). SEM was also used to test for the
moderating effects stated in the second and third hypotheses as well.
Because of the personal nature of salesperson performance and beliefs, and as
empirically experienced during the pre-test, salespeople may be inclined to respond in a
manner that is more socially desirable than honest. Social desirability is a potential bias
that social sciences researchers must be aware of and take into account for all self-report
surveys they conduct (Crowne and Marlowe 1960; Paulhus 1991). Such responses could
veil true variable relationships and improperly affect data results. An adapted version of
Pauhlus's (1991) Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding was included in the survey
to determine if there was a social desirability bias in the responses. Testing for reliability
in confirmatory factor analysis through structural equation modeling in M-Plus failed to
meet minimal reliability standards in both methods.
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Chapter 4
Results

This chapter provides descriptions of the characteristics of the salespeople
participants of the sample study. It also conveys the assessments of the construct
measures used to address the issues of dimensionality, convergent, and discriminant
validity (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). Additionally, the results obtained from the testing
of all hypotheses are in this chapter.
Sample
Overall, 300 surveys were distributed and received via the on-line market research
organization hired at the recommendation of research advisors and colleagues. Surveys
with no response to the industry worked in, the number of companies sold for, or years
spent working in sales were discarded, resulting in 253 responses being deemed usable,
for a response rate of 84.1%. Table 4.1 below lists the sample characteristics of the
study's final respondents.
From a broad perspective, the study's sample is representative of the United
States' population from which it was taken. For example, regarding ethnicity or heritage,
76% of the sample participants report a European or Caucasian heritage compared to a
national average of 74%. Asians constituted 5% of the sample vs. 3% of the country;
Latinos 8% (sample) compared to 11% nationally. As being representative of businessto-business salespeople, approximately 70% of the sample selected attended college that
compares favorably with the 76% of the national average for sales and sales related
occupations, according to the United States' Department of Labor' (www.bls.gov).
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Additionally, the DOL, for example, reports the mean percentage of women who
work as "Sales representatives - services and all others" and as "Sales representatives wholesale and manufacturing" as being 30% (www.bls.gov). The percent of women
respondents in this sample is 23%. (Note: This figure should not be confused with other
studies that report 50% percent of the workforce in the United States' Department of
Labor's category of 'sales and sales related occupations', which includes administrative
support staff such as secretaries and sales assistants who are not salespeople, as being
female). Representation of the business-to-business salesperson population is well
reflected in the sample. Of the entire group of respondents, seventy-seven percent
(77.1%) are male, sixty-seven percent (67.2%) are at least thirty-six years old, eightyeight percent (88%) at least attended college, and sixty-six percent (66%) have been
married at least once. This translates into the average respondent as being a middle-aged,
college-educated, Caucasian male, married at least once, earning at least $51,000
annually, who has worked in Sales for approximately ten years (perhaps soon after
leaving college). It is felt that this is a fairly accurate representation of the current
population of business-to-business salespeople.

TABLE 4.1
Respondent Salesperson Demographics
Characteristic
Frequency

Percent

Gender
Male
Female

195
58

77.1
22.9

Marital Status
Single
Married
Divorced

86
138
29

34
54.5
11.5
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Table 4.1
Respondent Salesperson Demographics (continued)
Characteristic
Frequency
Age
Under 25
26-35
36-45
46-55
56-65
Over 65
College Degree
Yes
Attended, no degree
Did not attend
Income
< $25k
$26k - $50k
$51k - $75k
$76k - $100k
$101k - $250k
Over $250k
Heritage
European
Latino
Asian
African-American
Middle-Eastern
Indian

Percent

26
57
42
61
49
18

10.3
22.5
16.6
24.1
19.4
7.1

145
77
31

57.3
30.4
12.3

52
71
60
40
20
10

20.6
28.1
23.7
15.8
7.9
3.9

194
20
13
11
8
7

76.7
7.9
5.1
4.3
3.2
2.8

The sample respondents exhibit valuable sales knowledge based on their
responses to demographic items regarding their training in sales, ethics, and sales
technology. For example, the average participant has spent almost 10 years in sales, six
of which are with their current employer; over half have had formal sales training
(58.5%) and formal training in ethics (53%). Table 4.2 provides the data concerning the
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respondents training in sales, ethics, sales technology (CRM), along with their personal
experiences as salespeople.
TABLE 4.2
Respondent Sales-Oriented Characteristics
Characteristic
Frequency
Formal Sales Training (Y/N)
Yes
148
No
105
If yes, where
School
Work
Both

Percent
58.5
41.5

7
99
42

4.7
66.9
28.4

134
119

52.9
47.1

17
73
44

12.7
54.5
32.8

70
183

27.7
72.3

If yes, where
School
Work
Both

8
43
19

11.4
61.4
27.2

What do you sell
Products
Services
Both

84
80
89

33.2
31.6
35.2

106
28
111
8

41.9
11.1
43.9
3.2

Formal Ethics Training
Yes
No
If yes, where
School
Work
Both
Sales Technology (CRM) Training
Yes
No

Method of Compensation
Straight Salary
Straight Commission
Salary plus Commission
Draw against Commission
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TABLE 4.2
Sample Sales-Related Characteristics (continued)
Mean number of years in sales:
Mean number of industries sold in:
Mean number of years with present employer:
Mean number of weekly hours spent selling:

9.68
3.14
6.04
29.39

Measurement Model: Factor Analysis and Validity. Prior to its final distribution,
the research survey was revised to ensure that scales with matching instructions for the
respondents were sectioned together. Efforts were made to ensure that at least one item
in every scale was reversed coded to help aid in discovering possible social desirability
bias responses. The senior member of the research study's advisory committee was
consulted to confirm the instrument was as well organized as it could be. After several
checks and double checks, the instrument was sent to the market research company to be
coded into an on-line version. Once completed, the URL link was provided to the author
for review. Upon completion of a few grammatical revisions for clarity, the survey was
distributed to potential respondents.
Three-hundred completed questionnaires were received by the author in the form
of an Excel spreadsheet for convenient loading into SPSS for analysis. The data was
screened for missing values, incomplete data, and other errors. During this time, it was
revealed that not all salesperson respondents completed all of the demographic items. Of
particular concern were the incomplete items related to the industry worked in, number of
years in selling and number of companies sold for during their selling career. These
cases were eliminated from inclusion in the final data analysis in an attempt to maintain
the study's and the data's integrity.
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Assessing the data empirically focused initially on the reliability and validity of
each measure. This involved reviewing the corrected item to total correlations coefficient
for each scale (Warner 2008). Strong results were obtained from this initial examination
for reliability. All but two items (ETH4, SUBSJP6) met the minimal criteria for
reliability with values of least a 3.0 (Bearden, Hardesty, and Rose 2001). Those items
with values below 3.0 were deleted. Less than impressive results were also obtained
from the Salesperson Control Belief scale. However, as it was designed to be one-third
of a composite scale, it was decided to retain it until further analysis was performed on
the scale in order to gain more information about it and the role it may play in the model.
Even though the research study utilized existing scales established in previously
published research, exploratory factor analysis was conducted to ensure that all factor
loadings were consistent with the pre-test results. As stated before, exploratory factor
analysis (EFA) has a different objective than that of confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).
EFA is used to discover if relationships exist between factors and indicators and, if so,
how strong that association is. EFA is a data-driven approach wherein, "all variables
load on all factors," (Hox and Bechger 1998, p. 356). It allows the number and nature of
the retained factors to be determined by the sample data provided, instead of specifying
the number of factors or relationship patterns in advance, usually keeping only the factors
that have an Eigenvalue of at least 1.0, in keeping with the Kaiser-Gutterman rule (Brown
2006; Hair et al. 2006). The Kaiser-Gutterman rule was followed to determine factor
selection, where only those latent factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0 were
selected (Brown 2006). If the eigenvalue is less than 1.0, then the corresponding factor
accounts for less variance than the indicator (Brown 2006). The result of the exploratory
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factor analysis using maximum likelihood estimation was the elimination of several items
(PT2, PT6, PT7, ETH2, ETH4, ETH5, SSJP4, SSJP6-8, OBSJP1-5, and CB1-2, CB4-6,
CB8).
Although EFA provides valuable information to the researcher, it, "fails to
provide the definitive test of measurement made possible by SEM applications of CFA,"
(Babin, et al. 2008, p. 284). Therefore, the data was subjected to confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA) using structural equation modeling, again with a maximum likelihood
estimation, to confirm factor loadings and to verify construct validity. One of structural
equation modeling's most important contributions to research is its ability to verify the
existence of construct validity through confirmatory factor analysis (Jöreskog and
Sorbom 1993; Babin, Hair, and Boles 2008). MPlus was utilized to analyze the raw data
for the confirmatory factor analysis. The results indicated that each indicator loaded onto
its construct. The results of the CFA are presented in Table 4.3 below.
Given the uncertain reliability of the chi-square test statistic (2) for samples
larger than 200 (Cudek and Henly 1991; Jackson, Gillaspy, and Purc-Stephenson 2009),
several fit indices were examined in adherence with Hu and Bentler's (1998) suggestion
to rely on those that have different property measures. For example, they recommend
using the Comparative Fit Index [CFI] along with a fit index that is residual-based, such
as the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual [SRMR] (Jackson, Gillaspy, and PurcStephenson 2009). This is also in keeping with Cortina's (2007) recommendation to use
fit measures that are not highly correlated. The results indicate a good fit of the model
(2125 =200.169 p=0.00, Comparative Fit Index [CFI] = .97; Tucker-Lewis Index
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[TLI]/Non-Normed Fit Index [NNFI] = .96; Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
[RMSEA] = .05; Standardized Root Mean Square Residual [SRMR] = .04).
As shown in Table 4.3, the levels of the standardized item loading estimates were
significant with values ranging from .60 to .92. T-values were each greater than 2.0,
providing further empirical support for convergent validity. The combination of the
loading estimates and the construct reliabilities also provides support for convergent
validity (Gerbing and Anderson, 1988; Babin and Boles 1996). Perceived Salesperson
Control Belief items (CB3, CB7) measured close to the minimal acceptance level at 2.11
and 2.13 respectively. Further, the average variance extracted (AVE) demonstrated
acceptable level of convergent validity with all values in excess of 0.50; the level for
Control Beliefs is barely at this level at .462, which is not surprising given that it is a twoitem measure (Fornell and Larcker 1981). Discriminant validity was supported, as the
largest value for shared variance between all construct pairings is 0.27, which is less than
the lowest value for AVE (0.46)(Fornell and Larcker 1981). These levels indicate that
the measures utilized in the survey demonstrate reliability, convergent validity, and
discriminant validity. Table 4.4 presents the correlations, means, and standard deviations
for each of the study's variables.

83

TABLE 4.3
Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results and
Scale Measurement Properties
Scale
Standardized t-Value
Loading
Access to Information (AVE = 0.600)
PT1
0.69
18.00
PT3
0.83
31.34
PT4
0.87
38.35
PT5
0.70
18.76

α
0.86

0.87

Use of Information (AVE = 0.690)
PT8
PT9
PT10

0.67
0.88
0.92

Unethical Salesperson Behavior (AVE = 0.619)
ETH6
ETH7
ETH8

0.89
0.75
0.82
0.89

Salesperson Control Belief (AVE = 0.462)
CB3
CB7
Salesperson Job Performance (AVE = 0.609)
SJP1
SJP2
SJP3
SJP5
Model Fit Statistics
2 = 200.169 (p = 0.00), df = 125
Comparative Fit Index [CFI] = .97
Non-Normed Fit Index [NNFI] = .96
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation [RMSEA] = .049
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual [SRMR] = .039
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17.69
41.73
48.53
0.89
32.73
17.59
44.26
0.63

0.60
0.75

2.11
2.13
0.86

0.81
0.80
0.81
0.70

27.33
25.78
26.49
18.01

TABLE 4.4
Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations of the Primary Research Variables
PT1
PT3

PT1
1
0.599**

PT3

PT4

PT5

PT4

0.586**

PT5

0.420**

PT8

0.454**

PT9

0.410**

PT10

0.429**

ETH1

0.165**

ETH3

.0206**

ETH6

0.147*

ETH7
ETH8
CB3
CB7
SJP1
SJP2
SJP3
SJP5
MEAN
SD

0.146*
0.148*
0.082
0.063
0.046
0.068
0.022
-0.007
5.13
1.509

1
0.728*
*
0.557*
*
0.432*
*
0.436*
*
0.446*
*
0.174*
*
0.177*
*
0.173*
*
0.223*
*
0.140*
0.111
0.086
-0.052
0.002
-0.017
-0.040
4.71
1.683

ETH6

ETH7

ETH6
ETH7
ETH8
CB3
CB7
SJP1
SJP2
SJP3
SJP5

1.000
0.666**
0.652**
0.033
0.128*
-0.023
-0.058
0.009
0.027

1.000
0.738**
0.021
0.069
-0.096
-0.128*
-0.114
-0.056

MEAN

4.64

3.81

3.87

5.74

SD

1.811

1.674

1.727

1.448

PT8

PT9

PT10

ETH1

ETH3

1
0.618**

1

0.506**

0.483**

1

0.465**

0.441**

0.577**

1

0.499**

.0506**

0.608**

0.814**

1

0.201**

.0138*

0.083

0.045

-0.011

1

0.192**

0.127*

0.055

0.057

0.030

0.604**

1.000

0.161*

0.163**

0.061

0.015

0.038

0.420**

0.612**

0.230**
0.193**
0.123
0.063
0.008
0.090
0.031
0.113
4.88
1.592

0.181**
0.124*
0.021
-0.041
0.022
0.062
0.057
0.070
4.57
1.566

0.055
0.058
0.051
0.072
0.021
0.040
0.049
0.013
5.55
1.446

0.045
0.037
0.085
0.068
0.100
0.056
0.066
0.072
5.46
1.451

-0.001
0.046
0.110
0.111
0.088
0.052
0.060
0.079
5.47
1.435

0.486**
0634**
0.023
0.116
-0.024
-0.009
-0.049
-0.045
4.22
1.689

0.618**
0.681**
0.011
0.051
-0.046
-0.091
-0.143*
-0.033
4.19
1.748

CB3

CB7

SJP1

SJP2

SJP3

1.000
0.628**
0.688**
0.542**

1.000
0.629**
0.624**

1.000
0.526**

5.79

5.31

5.07

5.44

5.05

1.493

1.415

1.275

1.313

1.382

ETH8

1.000
-0.001
0.066
-0.035
0.019
-0.051
0.023

1.000
0.450**
0.057
0.027
0.045
-0.036

1.000
0.020
-0.007
0.060
-0.037

** indicates correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
* indicates correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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SJP5

1

Structural Model and Hypotheses Tests
Each hypothesis was tested using MPlus with maximum likelihood (ML)
estimation. As the chi-square test statistic (2) is not considered overly reliable for
sample sizes greater than 200, several different fit indices were examined. The obtained
results indicate that the model fits the data fairly well (281 = 148.31, p = 0.000, Root
Mean Square Error of Approximation [RMSEA] = .057, Tucker-Lewis Index [TLI]/NonNormed Fit Index [NNFI] = .95, Comparative Fit Index [CFI] = .96) (Bentler and
Bonnett 1980; Hu and Bentler 1999; Brown 2006). Modification indices suggest
significant direct effects from perceived salesperson job performance (SJP) and
borderline significant effects from perceived salesperson control beliefs on the mediating
effect of salesperson perceived managerial use of information accessed by technologyenabled management on the relationship between salesperson perceived managerial
access to information as enabled by technology and the likelihood of unethical
salesperson behavior. The standardized parameter estimates and their associated t-value
are available in Table 4.5.
Mediation.
Hypothesis 1stated that salesperson perceived managerial use of information
accessed by technology-enabled management would have a mediating effect on the
relationship between salesperson perceived managerial access to information as enabled
by technology, and the likelihood of unethical salesperson behavior. A chi-square
difference test was performed between the fully mediated and partially mediated models
to determine if there was a significant different between the models. Fornell and Larcker
(1981) report, “the critical value for a chi-square with one degree of freedom at the .01
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level of statistical significance is 6.63," (p.44). The results exceed this criteria (∆21 =
16.877 p = 0.000). Thus, there is strong empirical support for a partially mediating effect
of the salesperson perceived managerial use of information (Fornell and Larcker 1981;
Babin and Boles 1996) and thus indicating empirical support for H1.
Moderation
Baron and Kenny (1986) define a moderating variable as one that, "affects the
direction and/or strength of the relation between an independent or predictor variable and
a dependent or criterion variable" (p. 1174). Hypothesis 2 stated that Perceived
Salesperson Job Performance would have a moderating effect on the relationship between
salesperson perceived managerial use of information accessed by technology-enabled
management and the likelihood of unethical salesperson behavior. Moderation indices
and the results of the interaction effects are provided in Table 4.5. Moderator effects are
indicated by the interaction of the independent variable and the moderator variable in
explaining the criterion variable (Baron and Kenny 1986). The test results indicate the
presence of significant interaction between the two variables SP and USE, (β = -0.21, t =
-2.38), thus providing support for H2.
Hypothesis 3 stated that Perceived Salesperson Control Beliefs would have a
moderating effect on the relationship between salesperson perceived managerial use of
information accessed by technology-enabled management and the likelihood of unethical
salesperson behavior. The test results indicate no direct statistical significance (β = 0.21,
t = 1.59). It is possible that as the CB variable was designed to measure salesperson's
beliefs regarding their ability to control their performance of unethical behaviors, a
different result may have been obtained had the items been phrased to measure
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salesperson's ability to control managerial access to or use of information related to
unethical salesperson behaviors. The standardized estimates and t-values for these
variables are included in Table 4.5. Figure 4.1 shows the hypotheses model with the
reported path estimates.

TABLE 4.5
Structural Model Parameters and Goodness-of-Fit Indices
Structural Model
Parameter
ACCESS
ACCESS
USE
PERFORM
CONTROL
SPxUSE
CBxUSE

→
→
→
→
→
→
→

Standardized
Estimate

t-Value

R2

0.66
0.41
- 0.23
-0.05
0.19
- 0.22
0.22

14.76
4.31
- 2.34
-0.58
1.32
- 2.38
1.59

0.43

USE
UNETH
UNETH
UNETH
UNETH
USE
USE

Model Fit Statistics
2 = 148.31 (p = 0.00), df = 81
Comparative Fit Index [CFI] = .96
Tucker-Lewis Index [TLI]/Non-Normed Fit Index [NNFI] = .95
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation [RMSEA] = .06
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual [SRMR] = .04
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0.10

Perceived
Managerial
Access to
Information

Perceived
Transparency
as Enabled by
Technology

.412

Likelihood
of
Unethical
Behavior

.657

Perceived
Managerial
Use of
Information

-.225
-.217

.215
Perceived
Beliefs
Towards
Unethical
Behavior

Perceived
Job
Performance

FIGURE 4.1
Hypothesis Model with Path Estimates

89

Chapter 5
Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter consists of three sections. The first section addresses the theoretical
implications and managerial applications of the study's findings. This is followed by a
discussion of the constraints and limitations experienced in conducting this research,
along with their impact. Lastly, suggestions and recommendations are provided
concerning future research of the issues contained in this study.
Discussion of the Results
This research introduces the concept of perceived salesperson transparency into
the Sales academic literature. The gap that previously existed in Sales literature
concerning perceived transparency of salespeople has begun to be partially filled.
Although transparency has been defined at a macro level both historically and
contextually, focusing on organizations and corporations, it has now been expanded to a
micro level. This is a new area of research that has not been undertaken previously - the
effects of transparency at a micro-level; specifically at the level of individual, boundaryspanning salespeople.
The greatest singular contribution of this research to both academics and
practitioners is the finding of empirical support that perceived transparency is not a
unidimensional idea, as has been traditionally viewed, but rather is comprised of at least
two dimensions - 1) perceived access to information and 2) use of accessed information.
This makes sense given two considerations that in order to use information, it must first
be accessed and that if it is perceived that any information accessed will not be used, than
its access should have no bearing or influence on behavior.
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Sales technology has grown at an incredible rate in the past decade or two.
Customer relationship management (CRM) has enabled companies to better identify,
better relate, and better serve their customers. Many studies has been undertaken that
focus on how both sales managers and sales people can best utilize recent developments
in technology (Morgan and Inks 2001; Jones, Sundaram, and Chin 2002; Robinson,
Marshall, and Stamps 2005). Ingram et al. (2002) presents a well-thought out overview
of how sales organizations could utilize new technologies more rewardingly over time.
Sales technology research has been conducted on the potential problems created
by recent technological developments (Spier and Venkatesh 2002; Honeycutt 2005); predeployment attitudes toward it and its intended use by administration and front-line
salespeople (Sundaram et al. 2007); making it effective (Hunter and Perreault 2007);
accompanying managerial implications (Bush, Moore, and Rocco 2005); and productivity
(Clark, Rocco, and Bush 2007). Hunter and Perreault (2006) propose a model for
organizations to measure the cost effectiveness of implementing new sales technologies,
including the effect of salesperson ability to learn and use the sales technology. This
current research study adds to this rapidly growing body of knowledge.
Hypothesis 1 is the heart of this research. The meditating effect of how
salespeople perceived accessed information will be used on the relationship between
perceptions of the accessing of the information and the likelihood of unethical
salesperson behavior was supported by the study‟s results. This indicates that it is not the
perception of visibility that drives salesperson behavior, but rather the perception of the
likelihood of negative consequences, of how knowledge gained by management through
visibility will be used. The application of gained information parallels one of the more
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common research topics in recent years: the application of sales technologies to CRM
(Leigh and Marshall 2001; Hunter and Perreault 2007).
The second hypothesis addresses perceived salesperson job performance as a
moderator on the relationship between use of information and the likelihood of unethical
behavior. The interaction effect of salesperson job performance on use of information
was significant, thereby supporting H2. If there is a salesperson perception that
management will use the information accessed by technology, how the information will
be used may expected to be negated by how valuable the salesperson perceives his or her
self to be to the organization. In other words, some salespeople may believe that their
performance (ends) is justified by unethical behavior (means). Therefore, if salesperson
job performance (as measured by self-reporting) is perceived by them to be strong, and
they credit its strength to behavior that is ethically questionable, they may in turn
perceive their performance as a justification and expect their managers to share this
thinking. If they do not perceive their performance as being strong enough to counter any
potential negative consequence to performing unethical behavior, they are more likely to
be swayed into avoiding such unacceptable behavior.
Lastly, the hypothesis 3 states that perceived salesperson control beliefs have a
moderating effect on the association of perceived use of information with the likelihood
of unethical salesperson behavior. Although this hypothesis was not statistically
supported by the results, it should be re-investigated; perhaps with different respondents
or different item wording. It may be that respondents interpreted the item to refer to
control over information use; if so, it would be interesting to re-examine this variable
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from the perspective of salesperson control over management's technology-enabled
access.
Theoretical Contributions
This study introduces the concept of perceived transparency into the academic
literature for Sales, Marketing, Ethics, and possibly Management. It also supplies a SEM
model for measuring perceived transparency that incorporates perceived use as a
mediating variable moderated by performance. This represents a new and important
direction for Sales research. Very little literature exists that addresses the potential
influence of salesperson perceived transparency on the ethicality of their behavior and
actions. Technology has changed the way many business operations are conducted and
this is especially true in Sales. Technology's impact is not yet fully known or understood
in many areas. This research helps explain a very important area that has been greatly
affected by technology - salespeople and their relationships with management and clients.
The former relationship is the heart of agency theory, the relationship between a
principals (i.e., management) and agents (i.e., salespeople) when a principal hires an
agent to perform a task or tasks in exchange for some form of agreed upon compensation.
Mallin and Delvecchio (2007) claim, “agency theory offers explanations of how the
boundary spanning positions affect the salesperson‟s perceptions . . . the agent‟s
(salesperson's) behavior is influenced by both his or her need for autonomy and the
principle‟s (sales manager‟s) need for control,” (p. 486). They found that salesperson
behavior is predicated upon whom they perceive the behavior will benefit most. This
may help in explaining the results of the tests for H1. If salespeople want their managers
to perceive that they (salespeople) are doing everything possible to make a sale, then they
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may engage in ethically questionable (but not illegal) behavior to show their
determination to generate revenue for the organization.
Agency theory has two primary goals of resolution: (1) moral hazard and (2)
adverse selection (Eisenhardt 1985). Moral hazard is defined as when the agent can take
actions that affect the principal but that the principal cannot monitor or enforce; i.e. "the
principal cannot verify the agent has behaved appropriately,” (p. 58). Adverse selection
is exemplified as when, “one party to a transaction knows things which are relevant to the
transaction but which are unknown to the other party,” (Kurland 1996, p. 54). The
enabling of management by technology to monitor more thoroughly its salespeople
(access information relevant to their actions and behaviors) should - in theory - lessen the
issue of moral hazard. However, as shown by the results of this study, that lessening is
mediated by the agent's perception of how the principal will use the knowledge obtained
by accessing information. This mediation is in turn, moderated by the salesperson's
perception of their performance. The salesperson may believe that their performance is
strong enough to protect them from any negative consequences that might befall them as
a result of their manger's having access to information concerning their behaviors. The
monitoring of communications between salesperson and customer (cell phone, e-mail,
file transfers, presentations, etc.) should also lessen the impact of adverse selection, as the
principal will be able to control the process via technology (Bush et al. 2007). What is
shown by this study is that the agent's behavior will be predicated not by who benefits the
most by the behavior in question, but by how the knowledge of their behavior will be
used and that its use provides more benefit to the principal than the agent.
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Managerial Applications and Contributions
Salespeople are the front-line boundary spanners of many organizations. How
they conduct themselves is a direct reflection on their company (Mulki, Jaramillo, and
Locander 2006). When a salesperson engages in unethical practices, either with
customers (misrepresenting information, exaggerating product or service benefits, lying
about competition) or with management itself (padding expense reports, withholding
market information), it can have seriously detrimental effects on the firm, its industry,
even on firm shareholders and stockholders. By enabling sales managers to have greater
access to information to salespersons' work-related activities, managers are in a position
to both better protect and better serve their organization.
Technology provides a way for managers to gain more control over the selling
process in both internal and external contexts, by providing the means for increased
surveillance of salesperson actions and behaviors (Bush et al. 2007). This can include
using GPS systems to track salespeople in the field, to know who is where at what time
throughout the day to ensure that all prospective and established customers are being
attended. Such technology also allows sales managers to increase the level of reporting
accountability of salespeople. Managers can compare GPS tracking reports to
salesperson call reports to ensure that they congruent and that the salesperson is not
falsifying important information. It allows them to transition from traditional outcomebased control systems to behavior-based systems (Anderson and Oliver 1987).
This research has far-reaching applications for sales managers. It provides
empirical support for the idea that if salespeople do not perceive any information
obtained by management will be used, i.e., if it's either just being collected for the sake of
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collecting or if it is not actually being collected, that management simply implies that
such is occurring, then they will behave as if there are no consequences. It is when they
perceive that knowledge or information accessed by management, as enabled by
technology, will be used that their behavior is impacted. In other words, salesperson
behavior is not driven by the bark alone, but rather by the possibility of being bitten.
Limitations
This research was conducted with several limitations that may have influenced the
results that were obtained. The first of these constraints is the sample from which the
data was collected. Second would be the self-report methodology used in obtaining
measures. Another potential limitation was that a longitudinal approach was not utilized.
The sample respondents were solicited through a professional market research
organization that has been used by several fellow researchers and was highly
recommended to the study's author. The primary constraint in obtaining respondents was
that they be currently employed as business-to-business salespeople. Several items were
included in the survey in order to weed out those who did not qualify, thus maintaining
the study's integrity. These qualifying items included, "How long have you worked in
Sales?", "How many different companies have you sold for?" and, "What industry do you
sell in?" Several dozen respondents were eliminated from the final data analysis as a
direct result of their responses to these items, thus raising a small level of doubt regarding
the others' legitimacy as professional salespeople. However, they did respond to these
screening items correctly and in all probability meet the criteria requested of the company
collecting the data. Discussions with other researchers who had patronized this company
garnered nothing but support and positive comments about them. Thus, it was decided
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that the responses of those who met the screening criteria should not be disqualified due
to the uncertainty of the others.
The second notable limitation with this research study concerns the self-report
methodology used, as opposed to scenarios or experimentation. Although Alexander and
Becker (1978) suggest scenarios create a more realistic situation for respondents,
attempting to reduce the infinite number of possible scenarios involving salespeople and
their behavioral determinants is too great to be fairly represented by a handful of
examples. Jaramillo et al.'s (2003) contention that low performing salespeople tend to
overestimating their performance and top salespeople underestimate theirs, self-report
scales are an accepted means of obtaining information about individual or group beliefs
regarding behaviors, especially given the lack of practical alternatives (Fishbein and
Ajzen 2010). Established scales have been adapted to maintain integrity, thus facilitating
comparisons and generalizations with other sales or ethics research (Hensel and Bruner
1992). Several research studies have been successfully conducted where self-reporting of
ethical behavior was employed (Himmelfarb and Lickteig, 1982; Beck and Ajzen 1991;
Harding et al. 2007).
It is recognized that self-presentation biases are a legitimate concern, especially
when dealing with socially desirable or undesirable behaviors. This may further explain
the results of H1 testing, that the respondents were simply responding in the way that they
would personally like to - if they sense that management does not trust them, they would
then behave in a manner worthy of distrust - if they could afford to take such a risk. To
help compensate for this, at least one item in each set was reverse coded. Additionally,
Fishbein and Ajzen's (2010) advice to researchers to be aware of possible threats to the
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validity by using behavioral self-reporting methods and to do what can be done to
increase reporting accuracy to its fullest was well heeded in this research. Adherence to
their counsel of encouraging respondents to be honest, to stress the confidentiality and
anonymity of their participation and emphasizing the scientific importance of their being
accurate in their responses helped to overcome this limitation.
The third constraint that may have influenced the results of this research is in the
decision not to use a longitudinal approach. The method used resulted in basically a
snapshot of individual salesperson perceptions regarding managerial use of technology to
enable their ability to access information regarding salesperson behaviors and their use of
such accessed information. Technology is far from being static. There seems to be no
end to the continual development of software or hardware tools that allow managers do
things they were unable to do earlier. Additionally, it must also be recognized that not all
managers or organizations adopt these technological tools at the same rate due to
budgetary or other constraints.
A longitudinal approach would have provided insight over time; for example,
does the introduction of advanced monitoring capability - such as those enabled by recent
technology developments - into an organization that had historically relied on traditional
monitoring methods alter salesperson perceptions, and if so, how? This and other
suggestions for future research opportunities provided by this study are discussed in the
next section.
Future Research Opportunities
A number of research opportunities can be gleaned from this study and could
greatly aid in the filling of the existing gap in personal selling literature. The first
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possible area, as mentioned briefly in Chapter 1, concerns the multiple dimensions of the
concept of transparency, especially when applied to individuals rather than organizations
or corporations. This study found support for two dimensions: access to information and
use of such information; there is more to how individuals define transparency than simply
how visible they are.
The reported path estimates show a significant positive relationship (standardized
estimate of .412 and a t-value of 4.31) between salesperson perceptions of managerial
access to information and the likelihood of their (salespeople) engaging in unethical
behavior. The interpretation of this would appear to be that the more salespeople
perceive management has access to information about salesperson behavior, the more
likely the salespeople are to perform unethical behavior? Why? Does this suggest a
retaliatory tactic by the salespeople in response to a perception of managerial mistrust?
Or is it possibly an attempt by salespeople to convey to management their willingness to
do whatever it takes to make a sale? Despite the increase in behavior-based evaluative
control systems, ultimately, a seller's objective performance (i.e., revenue generated,
units moved, goals reached, etc.) determines his or her fate. This is certainly an issue and
a finding worth additional pursuit.
Another collateral topic deals with whether salespeople perceive a difference
between transparency to management and transparency to customers. This could be
further ordered by customer type (prospective, new, or established), what is sold (product
or service), the impact and type of formal sales and/or ethics training the salesperson has,
or a range of demographic bases related to seller, buyer, or both. Yet another path could
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investigate technology's role on each of these customer types, as well as the various
communication methods used by salespeople (phone, e-mail, cold call, face-to-face, etc.).
Further research comparing salespeople based on the level of technological
involvement of their organizations would provide a very interesting follow-up
perspective to this study. Similarly, one item that was not included in this study that
could further the knowledge provided here would be re-examine these findings from the
perspective of how savvy salespeople perceive their managers to be from a technological
standpoint. Alternately, the technological literacy of salespeople and their clients could
provide important insight, as it has been well established that clients today expect sellers
to be as well versed on a range of topics related to products, the market, etc. as they are.
Outside of the immediate sales arena, this research study provides a starting point
to further existing research related to the relationship between ethics and behavior.
Salespople make an excellent subject given their role as boundary spanners and their duty
to manage a range of potentially conflicting internal and external relationships. They are
more tempted by the lure of short-term reward offered by unethical behavior than any
other organizational employee (Ferrell and Gresham 1985) is. Application of this study
to other departments (i.e., Accounting, Customer Service, Human Resources, etc.) within
a firm could provide beneficial information to management.
Conclusion
The concept of transparency, whether overt or perceived, despite its popularity
among business practitioners, has not been the subject of much academic investigation
concerning its cause, effect, and possible determinants. What research has been
published tends to limit its focus to a macro-level; how organizations and firms provide
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access to information about themselves, their goals, and their beliefs to shareholders and
stockholders. This current research takes a new and needed approach by examining
transparency at a micro-level, specifically the level of an organization's boundaryspanning, relationship-building, revenue-generating, front-line salespeople. The
existence of a direct relationship between an individual's perceived level of transparency
and the ethicality of their behavior is clearly supported. The behavioral influence on
salespeople created by their being transparent to management, through developments in
technology, comes less from management's having access to salesperson behavioral
information and more from salesperson perceptions regarding managerial use of the
accessed information. Managers who desire less unethical behavior from their sales
forces would do well to utilize the information they are enabled to access with technology
or to at the least attempt to increase their sale forces' perception of their willingness to
use such information and knowledge. Researchers who interests include personal selling,
ethics, salesperson behavior, or the impact of technology on sales are invited and
encouraged to continue expanding this area.
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Appendix A.
Salesperson Questionnaire - Pretest Version
Thank you for agreeing to complete this survey of salespeople. It consists of sections
concerning your perceptions of sales-related statements. There are no right or wrong
answers. Your responses are completely confidential and will only be used for this study.
In order to be meaningful, it is very important that you respond to ALL items openly and
honestly. Thank you.

Please read each statement below, then circle the number that best reflects the
experiences of salespeople in general, with 1 representing, “not at all” and 7
representing, “very much”.
Sales managers use technology to . . .
1. Monitor salesperson activities.
2. Review salesperson reports more thoroughly.
3. Access salesperson communications.
4. Track salesperson-client interactions.
5. Watch salesperson movements in the field.
6. Control the selling process.
7. Influence salesperson behavior.
8. Hold salespeople accountable.
9. Improve salesperson performance.
10. Provide better salesperson evaluations.

1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567

Ethical Salesperson Behavior Scale
Please read each statement below very carefully, then indicate how likely you think
salespeople are to perform the described behavior is by circling the number that best
corresponds to your beliefs, where1 = Not Very Likely and 7 = Very Likely.
1. Pad an expense account.
2. Blame someone else for his or her mistakes.
3. Misrepresent warranties or guarantees.
4. Pretend not to be a salesperson to prospects.
5. Exaggerate product or service benefits.
6. Lie about availability to make a sale.
7. Lie about the competition to make a sale.
8. Submit confusing invoices to clients.
9. Falsify reports submitted to management.
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1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567

Salesperson Belief Scale
Please read each statement below very carefully and decide how strongly each statement
applies to your profession. The phrase “deceiving a client” means providing wrong
information or not fully disclosing all relevant information; “submitting false information
on a report” refers to any type of report (i.e., expense accounts, call reports, test results,
etc.). Then, please put an “X” in the space that most closely reflects your belief
regarding the statement:
1. Deceiving a client is:
Bad _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Good
Foolish _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Wise
Harmful _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Beneficial
Wrong _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Not wrong
Avoidable _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Necessary
2. Deceiving a client can cause a salesperson to lose their job.
Disagree_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Agree
3. Deceiving a client can cause irreparable harm to a salesperson‟s relationship with that
client.
Disagree_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Agree
4. Deceiving a client can usually help make a sale.
Disagree_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Agree
5. Deceiving a client rarely causes trouble.
Disagree_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Agree
6. Deceiving a client should result in the salesperson‟s termination.
Disagree_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Agree
7. Submitting false information on a report is:
Bad _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Good
Foolish _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Wise
Harmful _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Beneficial
Wrong _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Not wrong
Avoidable _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Necessary
8. Submitting false information on a report can cause a salesperson to lose their job.
Disagree_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Agree
9. Submitting false information on a report can cause irreparable harm to a salesperson‟s
relationship with their manager.
Disagree_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Agree
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10. Submitting false information on a report can usually help a salesperson keep their job.
Disagree_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Agree
11. Submitting false information on a report rarely causes trouble.
Disagree_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Agree
12. Submitting false information on a report should result in the salesperson‟s
termination.
Disagree_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ Agree
Please read each statement below very carefully and then please put a large “X” in the
space that most closely reflects your belief regarding the statement:
1. “Most people who matter to me would NOT CARE/DISAPROVE if I deceived a
client.”
NOT CARE _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____DISAPPROVE
2. “No one who is important to me would think it was OKAY/NOT OKAY to deceive a
client.”
OKAY_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ NOT OKAY
3. “The people in my life whose opinion matters to me WOULD/WOULD NOT be willing
to deceive a client in a similar situation.”
WOULD _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ WOULD NOT
4. “The people in my life whose opinion matters to me WOULD/WOULD NOT be willing
to submit false information on a report in a similar situation.”
WOULD _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ WOULD NOT
5. “No one who is important to me would think it was OKAY/NOT OKAY to submit false
information on a report.”
OKAY_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ NOT OKAY
6. “Most people who matter to me would NOT CARE/DISAPPROVE if I submitted false
information on a report.”
NOT CARE____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____DISAPPROVE

Next, please read each statement below very carefully and decide how true or false you
feel each statement is. Then, please put a large “X” in the space that most closely reflects
your belief regarding the statement:
1. “Salespeople have a great deal of control over whether they get caught deceiving a
client.”
True _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ False
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2. “Salespeople have the skills needed to deceive a client under any circumstance.”
True _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ False
3. “It is mostly up to the salesperson whether or not they deceive a client."
True _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ False
4. “Even if they had a good reason, a salesperson could not bring his or herself to deceive
a client.”
True _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ False
5. “Salespeople have a great deal of control over whether they submit false information
on a report.”
True _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ False
6. “Salespeople have the skills needed to submit false information on a report.”
True _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ False
7. “It is mostly up to the salesperson whether or not they submit false information on a
report."
True _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ False
8. “Even if they had a good reason, a salesperson could not bring his or herself to submit
false information on a report.”
True _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ False
For Questions 1 – 8 below: Please read the statements below and then rate yourself
according to how well you have performed - relative to the other salespersons you know
in selling situations similar to your own- on a one-to-seven scale, where “1” = needs
improvement and “7” = outstanding.‟‟
1. Listening attentively to identify and understand
the real concerns of your customers.

1234567

2. Building your clients‟ business with your
products or services.

1234567

3. Working out solutions to a customer‟s
questions or objections.

1234567

4. Working with customers to help improve their
profitability.

1234567

5. Working with buyers to develop a partnership
that is profitable to both firms.

1234567
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6. Getting required paperwork done.

1234567

7. Addressing administrative responsibilities
in a timely manner.

1234567

8. Submitting required reports on time.

1234567

For Questions 9 – 13: Please rate yourself in each of the five areas according to how you
have performed relative to the average salesperson in your organization.
9. Sales commissions earned.

1234567

10. Exceeding sales objectives and targets.

1234567

11. Generating new- customer sales.

1234567

12. Generating current-customer sales.

1234567

13. Overall selling performance.

1234567

Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate how
true it is regarding you.
Not true

1--------2--------3--------4--------5--------6--------7
Somewhat
Very True
True

_____ 1. I never swear.
_____ 2. I never cover up my mistakes.
_____ 3. I have done things that I don‟t tell other people about.
_____ 4. I don‟t gossip about other people‟s business.
_____ 5. I always obey traffic laws, even if I am unlikely to get caught.
_____ 6. I have never taken sick leave from work or school when I wasn‟t really sick.
_____ 7. I sometimes tell lies if I have to.
_____ 8. I have never littered.
_____ 9. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.
_____ 10. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
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Last, please share some general information about yourself.
Gender:

Male_____

Female_____

Marital:

Single _____ Married _____ Divorced _____

Age:

<25___

26–45___

46–65___

65+___

College degree

Yes___

No___ Attended, no degree___

Personal
Income:

Less than $25k_____
$51k-$75k_____
$100k-$250k_____

$26k-$50k_____
$76k-$100k_____
Over $250k_____

Products___

Both___

Sales Experience:
What do you sell?

Services___

How many years have you been selling? _____
How many different companies have you sold for? _____
How many years have you been with your current employer? _____
How many salespeople are employed by your organization?
1–10___
10–25___
26–50___
51–100___
100–500___
500+___
How many hours per week on average do you work selling? _____
Have you had any formal sales training? Yes_____ No_____
If yes, where? College _____
Job-provided _____
Have you had any formal ethics training? Yes_____ No_____
If yes, where? College _____
Job-provided _____
What is your primary method of compensation?
___Salary
___Straight commission
___Salary plus Commission
___Draw Against Commission

End of Survey.
Thank you very much for your time, effort, and honesty in completing this. Your
responses are confidential and
will only be used for this study. Thank you.
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Appendix B.
Salesperson Research Survey - Final Version
________________________________________________________________
INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT
I hereby agree to participate in this research study on transparency, technology, and
behavior in Sales. I understand that I am under no obligation to participate in this study,
may withdraw at any time, that my responses are completely confidential, are only for the
purpose of this research, and will be destroyed when the study is over.
To acknowledge that you agree with the above statements and consent to participate,
please type today's date below.
Today's date: _________
________________________________________________________________
SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you for agreeing to assist this research by completing the following questionnaire.
It is VERY IMPORTANT that you respond to EVERY item, as honestly as possible.
Please read each statement carefully.
SECTION I: Please respond based on your knowledge of salespeople in general (i.e.,
those other than yourself).
Using a scale where "1" represents "NOT AT ALL" and "7" represents "VERY MUCH,"
how does each statement complete the phrase below:
"Sales managers use technology to…"
1. Monitor salesperson activities.
2. Review salesperson reports more thoroughly.
3. Access salesperson communications.
4. Track salesperson-client interactions.
5. Watch salesperson movements in the field.
6. Avoid controlling the selling process.
7. Influence salesperson behavior.
8. Hold salespeople accountable.
9. Improve salesperson performance.
10. Provide better salesperson evaluations.
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1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567

Again, based on your knowledge of salespeople in general (i.e., those other than
yourself), please indicate how likely you think salespeople are to perform the following
behaviors by circling the number that best reflects your belief with 1 indicating “Not
Likely” and 7 indicating “Very Likely.
1. Pad an expense account.
2. Exaggerate product/service benefits.
3. Misrepresent a warranty or guarantee.
4. Admit to making a mistake.
5. Pretend not to be a salesperson to prospects.
6. Lie to make a sale.
7. Submit confusing invoices.
8. Falsify information on work-related reports,
(such as expense reports, test results, etc.)

1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567

For these items, please read each statement below, then indicate how true or false you
believe it is - based on your knowledge of salespeople in general (i.e., those other
than yourself) - by putting an “X” in the space that most closely reflects your belief:
1. Salespeople have a great deal of control over whether they get caught engaging in
unethical behavior with clients.
False _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ True
2. Salespeople do not have the necessary skills to engage in unethical behavior with
clients.
False _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ True
3. It is mostly up to salespeople whether or not they engage in
unethical behavior with clients.
False _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:__ ___:_____ True
4. Even if they have a good reason, salespeople could not bring
themselves to engage in unethical behavior with clients.
False _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ True
5. Salespeople have very little control over whether they get
caught submitting false information to management.
False _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ True
6. Salespeople have the skills needed to submit false
information to management.
False _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ True
7. It is mostly up to salespeople whether or not they submit
false information to management.
False _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ True
8. Even if they have a good reason, salespeople could not bring
themselves to submit false information to management.
False _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ True
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Now, again based on your knowledge of salespeople in general where 1 = “not at all”
and 7 = “very much”, please indicate how well you believe each statement describes the
attitude salespeople have towards clients.
1. Better informed about the market than SP.
2. Equipped with better technology than SP.
3. Are more detail-oriented than necessary.
4. Expect salespeople to do too much.
5. Should not be trusted.
6. Are more concerned with cost than value.
7. Are difficult to get in contact with.
8. Are extremely loyal to vendors.
9. Believe they know more than salespeople.
10. Think sellers make too much profit.

1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567

SECTION II: For this section, please base your responses on only you as a
salesperson and no one else. Thank you.
Now, thinking about yourself as a salesperson, please read each statement below. Then
for each one honestly rate yourself relative to other salespeople you know in selling
situations similar to your own. Here 1 means “Need Improvement” and 7 means
“Outstanding.”
1. Listening attentively to identify and
understand the real concerns of your customers.
2. Building your clients‟ business with your
products or services.
3. Working out solutions to a customer‟s
questions or objections.
4. Working with customers to help improve their
profitability.
5. Working with buyers to develop a partnership
that is profitable to both firms.
6. Avoiding required paperwork.
7. Addressing administrative responsibilities
in a timely manner.
8. Submitting required reports on time.
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Next, relative to the average salesperson in your organization, please rate yourself,
honestly, in each of the five areas below, with 1 representing “very much below average”
and 7 representing “very much above average.”
9. Sales commissions earned.
10. Exceeding sales objectives and targets.
11. Generating new-customer sales.
12. Generating current-customer sales.
13. Overall selling performance.

1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
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Using the scale below as a guide, based on yourself alone and not on any other
salespeople, write a number beside each statement to indicate how true it is as it applies
to you.
1--------2--------3--------4--------5--------6--------7
Not true
Somewhat True
Very True
1._____ I never swear.
2._____ I never cover up my mistakes.
3._____ I have done things that I do not tell other people about.
4._____ I do not gossip about other people‟s business.
5._____ I always obey traffic laws, even if I am unlikely to get caught.
6._____ I have never taken sick leave from work or school when I was not really sick.
7._____ I sometimes tell lies if I have to.
8._____ I have never littered.
9._____ There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.
10.____ I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.

SECTION III: In this section, please be sure to respond to EACH AND EVERY
item to help classify your responses. Thank you.
Please take a few moments to share some general information about yourself as an
individual and as a salesperson.
1. Gender:
2. Marital:
3. Age:

Male_____ Female_____
Single _____ Married _____ Divorced _____
<25___
26–35___
36–45___
46-55___ 56-65___
>65___
4. Ethnicity: European___ Asian___
African-American___
Latino___
Indian___ Middle-Eastern___
5. College:
Graduated___ (Major: ____________________)
Attended, but no degree___
Did not attend__
6. Graduate degree (i.e., MBA):
Yes___
No___
7. Income:
<$25k___
$26k-$50k___
$51k-$75k ___
$76k-$100k___
$101k-$150k___
>$150k___
Sales and Selling Experience:
8. How many years (total) have you been in sales? ___
9. How many industries have you sold in? ___
10. What industry do you currently work in? __________________
11. What do you sell? Products___ Services___ Both___
12. How long have you been selling in this industry? ___
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13. How many firms have you sold for in this industry? ___
14. How long have you been with your current employer? ___
15. How many salespeople work for your current organization? ___
1–10___10–25___26–50___51–100__ 100–250___ 250-500__500+___
16. How many average hours per week do you spend selling? ___
17. Have you had any classroom-style or seminar sales training?
Yes___
No___
17a. If yes, where?
School___ Work___
Both___
18. Have you had any classroom-style or seminar ethics training? Yes___
18a. If yes, where?
School___ Work___
Both___
19. Have you had any training in sales technology (i.e., CRM)?
Yes___ No___
19a. If yes, where?
School___ Work___
Both___
20. What is your primary method of compensation?
Straight Salary____
Straight commission____
Salary plus Commission___
Draw Against Commission___

Thank you for completing this questionnaire.
Your contribution, time, and honesty are sincerely appreciated.
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No___

Appendix C.
Original Scale Items from the Cravens, et al. (1993) and Babakus, et al. (1996) Scale
Designed to Measure Behavior-Based Sales Manager Control.

To What Extent Do You:
Monitor

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Spend time in the field with salespeople
Make joint calls with salespeople.
Regularly review call reports from salespeople.
Monitor the day-to-day activities of salespeople.
Observe the performance of salespeople in the field.
Pay attention to the extent to which salespeople travel.
Closely watch salespeople's expense accounts.
Pay attention to the credit terms that salespeople quote customers.
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